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ARTICLE

THE CASE AGAINST SHAREHOLDER EMPOWERMENT

†

WILLIAM W. BRATTON & MICHAEL L. WACHTER

††

Many look toward enactment of the law-reform agenda held out by proponents of shareholder empowerment as a part of the regulatory response to the
current financial crisis. This Article argues that the financial crisis exposes
major weaknesses in the shareholder empowerment case. Our claim is that
shareholder empowerment delivers management a simple and emphatic marching order: manage to maximize the market price of the stock. This is exactly
what the managers of a critical set of financial firms did in recent years. They
managed to a market that focused on increasing observable earnings, and, as it
turned out, they failed to factor in concomitant increases in risk that went
largely unobserved. The fact that management bears primary responsibility for
the disastrous results does not suffice to effect a policy connection between increased shareholder power and sound regulatory reform. A policy connection
instead turns on a counterfactual question: whether increased shareholder
power would have imported more effective risk management in advance of the
crisis. We conclude that no plausible grounds exist for making such a case. In
the years preceding the financial crisis, shareholders validated the strategies of the
very financial firms that pursued high-leverage, high-return, and high-risk strat-
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egies and penalized those that did not. It is hard to see how shareholders, having
played a role in fomenting the crisis, have a positive role to play in its resolution.
The prevailing legal model of the corporation strikes a better balance between the powers of directors and shareholders than does the shareholdercentered alternative. Shareholder proponents see management agency costs as a
constant in history and shareholder empowerment as the only tool available to
reduce them. This Article counters this picture, making reference to agency
theory and recent history to describe a dynamic process of agency-cost reduction.
It goes on to show that shareholder empowerment would occasion significant
agency costs of its own by forcing management to a market price set under
asymmetric information in most cases and set in speculative markets in which
heterogeneous expectations obscure the price’s informational content in others.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2006, shareholder empowerment figured prominently in a wellpublicized law-reform agenda presented by the Committee on Capital
Markets Regulation, a private group concerned about the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets. The Committee’s report connected
shareholder power to market control, reasoning that enhanced
shareholder rights provide accountability and that accountability
means lower agency costs, higher market prices, and, accordingly, a
1
more competitive equity marketplace. In addition, the Committee
argued that strong shareholder rights invite more dependence on
market discipline of managers and “go hand in hand with reduced
2
regulation or litigation.” Restating, “accountability” means market
control, which means lower agency costs. The Committee thereby
weighed in on corporate law’s leading structural question: who
should decide how best to maximize long-term value for the share3
holders’ benefit—the managers or the shareholders themselves? The
1

See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT 93 (2006), available at
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf (arguing
that enhanced shareholder rights in the areas of takeover defenses and remedy selection
will reduce expected agency costs and incentivize entry into U.S. public markets). The
Committee’s report focused on shareholder ratification of poison pills adopted by a staggered board, majority voting for boards of directors, shareholder access to the director
nomination process, executive pay, and contractual alternatives to litigation. Id. at 16-18.
2
Id. at 16.
3
This is often referred to as the debate over “shareholder primacy.” But shareholder primacy has two aspects, the first going to the objective of the corporation and
the shareholders’ place as legal beneficiary, and the second going to the allocation of
power within the corporation. This Article takes the first aspect as settled in favor of
the shareholders and focuses on the second aspect. To avoid confusion, we avoid the
term entirely, instead using the phrase “shareholder empowerment.”
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question holds out a choice between a shareholder-driven, agency
model of the corporation, guided by informational signals from the
financial markets, and the prevailing legal model, which vests business
decisionmaking in managers who possess an informational advantage
regarding business conditions. The shareholder side contends that
the prevailing model fails to provide a platform conducive to aggressive entrepreneurship and instead invites management self-dealing
and conservative decisionmaking biased toward institutional stability.
It looks to a shareholder community populated with actors in financial
markets for corrective inputs. Unlike the managers, who are conflicted and risk averse, the shareholders come to the table with a pure
financial incentive to maximize value. It is a high-stakes debate. For
the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, along with many other
proponents of shareholder empowerment, the nation’s global competitive fitness hangs in the balance.
Even so, shareholder proponents have shifted their emphasis in
4
the wake of the financial crisis of 2008. Although “accountability”
remains the ultimate goal, we hear fewer references to market control
as the means to that end, presumably because it resonates equivocally
in light of recent market failures. Proponents instead hold out the
5
need to restore “trust.” We illustrate this approach with the com-

4

But see, e.g., Press Release, Council of Institutional Investors, CII Applauds Introduction of Shareholder Bill of Rights Act (May 19, 2009), available at http://www.
cii.org/UserFiles/file/draft%20press%20release%20schumer%2005-19-09.pdf (quoting CII Chair and CALPers CIO Joseph A. Dear, who stated that the proposed act was
needed “to promote market discipline and accountability”).
5
See The Causes and Effects of the Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 4 (2008) (statement of Nell Minow,
Editor, The Corporate Library) (connecting shareholder power with the restoration of
credibility); Luigi Zingales, The Future of Securities Regulation 2, 24-27 (Chi. Booth Sch.
of Bus., Working Paper No. 08-27, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1319648 (connecting trust and accountability, and contending that shareholder nominations will channel shareholder inputs to long-term value and deter managing to the
market); Press Release, The Office of Senator Charles Schumer, Schumer, Cantwell Announce “Shareholder Bill of Rights” to Impose Greater Accountability on Corporate
America (May 19, 2009), available at http://schumer.senate.gov/new_website/
record.cfm?id=313468 [hereinafter Schumer Press Release] (emphasizing the need to
restore confidence through greater accountability and shareholder empowerment); cf.
Roger Lowenstein, A Seat at the Table, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2009, (Magazine), at 11 (arguing that shareholder-nominated board members will cause shareholders to shift
from a short-term view, in which exit is the primary means of expressing discontent, to
a long-term view, in which “the less forceful, but more supple ‘voice’” is used effectively). For a bank chairman’s thoughts on the need to restore trust, see Stephen Green,
Group Chairman, HSBC Holdings plc, Speech at the British Bankers’ Association Annual
International Banking Conference: Restoring Governance and Trust 3 ( June 30, 2009),
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ments of former Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chair6
man Arthur Levitt on the meltdown in the financial sector, which was
still in its early phase when he wrote in the summer of 2008. For Levitt, the subprime collapse, the Bear Stearns implosion, and revelations of poor risk management at large financial firms had “injected a
7
dangerously large degree of mistrust into the markets.” He believes
that managers and boards should have raised the alarm, and that enhanced shareholder voice, “[w]hile not a panacea, . . . would go a long
8
way in helping to restore trust.”
The trust characterization resonates because it focuses on management culpability, and the managers who now have (or recently
have had) to rely on government largesse do bear primary responsibility for the decisions that precipitated the financial crisis. Executive
pay has become a flashpoint political issue as a result of the culpability
9
designation, and the resulting popular picture is not pretty. Managers of financial companies appear as quick-buck artists who used their
compensation schemes to siphon millions of dollars from companies
10
on the brink of collapse. Their shareholders, as the primary bearers
11
of losses incurred, emerge as victims along with the taxpayers.
Blame for managers means sudden political traction for a
longstanding law-reform agenda put forward by proponents of shareholder empowerment. We have already seen “say on pay” mandates
imposed on TARP recipients, along with substantive constraints on

available at http://www.hsbc.com/1/PA_1_1_S5/content/assets/newsroom/090630_
speech_bba.pdf.
6
See Arthur Levitt, Jr., Op-Ed., How to Boost Shareholder Democracy, WALL ST. J., July
1, 2008, at A17 (advocating for the repeal of prior SEC decisions in order to increase
shareholder control and accountability).
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
See, e.g., Deborah Solomon & Dan Fitzpatrick, Czar Blocks BofA Chief’s Pay, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 16, 2009, at A1 (reporting that the Treasury Department’s “special master”
for compensation objected to Bank of America CEO Kenneth D. Lewis’s 2009 compensation, pushing Lewis to agree to forego salary for the year).
10
Shareholder rights advocates often use this imagery. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra
note 5, at 11 (“[M]anagers cannot be trusted not to (grossly) overpay themselves . . . .”);
Schumer Press Release, supra note 5 (“[T]he leadership at some of the nation’s most
renowned companies took too many risks and too much in salary . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Senator Schumer)); cf. Zingales, supra note 5, at 23-24
(noting the image, but arguing against direct regulation of pay).
11
See Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. § 2 (describing
legislative findings and noting that a lack of accountability “led to the loss of trillions of
dollars in shareholder value, losses that have been borne by millions of Americans who
are shareholders through their pension plans, 401(k) plans, and direct investments”).
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12

modes and amounts of compensation. Broad “say on pay” mandates
13
appear in prominent proposed legislation and in the Administra14
tion’s reform agenda. There is also a high-profile SEC proposal to
amend the proxy rules to require inclusion of shareholder board no15
minees in management proxy statements.
While this reaction is perfectly understandable, it remains highly
questionable as a policy matter. This Article states the contrary case,
showing that the financial crisis, far from concluding the matter in the
shareholders’ favor, bolsters the case for the prevailing legal model. A
shareholder-based agency model of the corporation sends management a simple instruction: in all circumstances, manage to maximize
12

See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), Pub. L. No. 110-343,
§ 111(b)(2)(A), 122 Stat. 3765, 3777, amended by American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, sec. 7001, § 111, 123 Stat. 115, 516-20 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 5221) (requiring sellers of troubled assets to have “limits on compensation
that exclude incentives for senior executive officers of a financial institution to take
unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value of the financial institution during the period that the Secretary holds an equity or debt position in the financial institution”). Subsequent Treasury guidelines require that for all TARP recipients executive base pay be limited to $500,000 and that any incentive pay must be granted in the
form of restricted stock, although these rules can be waived by shareholders except for
those companies receiving “exceptional financial recovery assistance.” Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces New Restrictions on Executive Compensation (Feb. 4, 2009), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg15.htm; see also
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 secs. 7000–7002, §§ 111, 109(a), 123
Stat. at 516-21 (amending EESA and limiting incentive payments to the CEO and the
twenty next-highest-paid executives of large TARP recipients to one-half of the executive’s salary (other than payments required under earlier contracts and restricted stock),
prohibiting golden parachutes and defined “luxury” expenditures, and mandating “say
on pay” votes). The SEC has proposed a rule implementing the “say on pay” mandate.
See Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation of TARP Recipients, 74 Fed.
Reg. 32,474 (proposed July 8, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (amending
proxy rules to help implement EESA requirements).
13
See Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074 § 3 (amending prior acts to
require that proxies “include a separate resolution subject to shareholder vote to approve the compensation of executives”).
14
See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW
FOUNDATION 29-30 (2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/
FinalReport_web.pdf (expressing the Department’s intent to support increased transparency in compensation practices and supporting “say on pay” legislation).
15
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (proposed
June 18, 2009) (to be codified in scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.) (proposing to “require
companies to include shareholder nominees for director in the companies’ proxy materials” in certain circumstances). In addition, the New York Stock Exchange has
amended its rules to eliminate broker discretionary voting for election of directors (for
companies not registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940). N.Y. STOCK
EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 402.08(B)(19) (2009), available at http://
nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM/sections (follow “Section 4” hyperlink).
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the market price of the stock. And that is exactly what managers of
some critical financial firms did in recent years. They managed to a
market that focused on their ability to increase observable earnings
and, as it turned out, failed to factor in concomitant increases in risk
that went largely unobserved.
Risk taking is at the heart of the capitalist system, but so is the incentive-compatible rule that the risk takers internalize not only the
expected higher returns but also the expected higher systematic risk.
For the financial institutions judged too big to fail, and apparently for
others as well, risk internalization has not proven to be the case. The
economic rescue’s net costs amount to an externalization of the risks
taken and an uninvited external shock to the political economy.
A negative implication follows for shareholder empowerment. If
managers misunderstood the quantum of risks they were taking, then
shareholders with more limited access to the relevant information certainly were no better informed and accordingly had no role to play in
preventing externalization. Even as managers must shoulder the
blame for the crisis, current complaints about management irresponsibility can legitimately be restated as complaints about management
to the market. At the same time, management’s risk aversion—its
long-derided willingness to accept reduced risk in exchange for institutional stability—all of a sudden holds out advantages. Managers are
risk averse because they fear losing their jobs in bankruptcy. Whereas
bankruptcy is a natural element in the “winds of creative destruc16
tion,” those winds blow no good when the losses are externalized to
the U.S. Treasury.
The prevailing legal structure of the corporation holds out a robust framework. Corporate law has always performed a balancing act
with management discretion and shareholder power. The balance,
however, has always privileged the directors and their appointed managers in business policymaking because they are better informed than
the shareholders and thus better positioned to take responsibility for
both monitoring and managing the firm and its externalities. As between directors and shareholders, it is the directors who have the best
access to information and are best able to serve as the monitors of the
managers, increasing the likelihood of compliance with continuing
16

Cf. William J. Abernathy & Kim B. Clark, Innovation: Mapping the Winds of Creative Destruction, 14 RES. POL’Y 3, 6 (1984) (describing Joseph Schumpeter’s theory that
innovation acts as a force of “creative destruction,” reducing the value of existing competence and inspiring new growth).
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and emerging regulations. As between managers and shareholders,
the managers are the ones who have the day-to-day knowledge of the
company, its history, policies, opportunities, vulnerabilities, and challenges. The managers are likely to have the information and institutional perspective suited to anticipate points of conflict with the outside political economy and to formulate a responsive strategy. As long
as they remain faithful, they are best suited to maximize the value of
the corporation and thus the shareholders’ residual claim.
The case outlined above must confront two responses from proponents of shareholder empowerment: First, shareholder incentives
are correctly aligned and their business-policy preferences accordingly
superior to those of conflicted managers; therefore, shareholder authority would reduce agency costs and increase the value of the corporation. Second, the efficiency of stock prices ameliorates the problem
of information asymmetry and reliably communicates both the value
implications of corporate policy to the shareholders and the business
preferences of the shareholders to the managers. This Article rebuts
this depiction of a win-win combination of shareholder power and
market-sensitive management.
Part I frames the terms of debate. We ground our conceptual case
for the prevailing legal model in Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen’s
description of the governance of publicly traded corporations. For
Fama and Jensen, the prevailing legal model follows from an agencycost trade-off. The model divides the economic rights attached to the
residual claim both from the power to set corporate policy, which goes
to the managers, and from the responsibility to monitor the agents
who execute the policy, which goes to the board. This separation follows from a natural allocation of interest, information, and expertise.
It does so for the purpose of reducing the agency costs that would result if shareholders that are both dispersed and diversified had the
power to impose policy inputs. Agency costs do result, but as an embedded and inevitable result of dispersed ownership.
Part II looks into the debate’s economic stakes, pushing back
against the shareholder claim that systemic slack results in enormous
agency costs that can be reduced only through fundamental law
reform. We ground our response in Michael Jensen and William
Meckling’s seminal theory of agency costs and its projection of a dynamic, market-based process of agency-cost reduction. The shareholder proponents depict agency costs as a static, ahistorical constant.
We question this picture from a historical perspective, asserting that
even though agency costs tied to shareholder disempowerment had a
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moment of high salience during the 1980s, their importance diminished in subsequent years. The diminution followed from a dynamic
pattern of response to underlying market forces, both inside boardrooms and outside in the markets. Inside, management reoriented
itself and adopted key points from the shareholder agenda into corporate business plans, facilitating mergers and restructurings and
stepping up cash payouts to shareholders. Outside, shareholders got
stronger. The rationally apathetic investor waned as the institutional
shareholder voice rose in volume and increasingly independent
boards of directors got into the habit of listening. In our view, the
shareholder case emerges denuded of urgency.
Part III steps into the brave new world projected by the shareholder proponents, to see how things will work. We draw on financial
economic theory to identify serious problems under the new regime.
The claim of market price robustness rests on the assertion that recent
advances in the stock market’s informational efficiency render fluid,
unaffiliated groups of shareholders well enough informed to make wise
choices on many corporate matters. Unfortunately, the stock price has
two material shortcomings when viewed as a source of day-to-day instructions for business policy: First, stock prices are not fully informed
because of informational asymmetries enjoyed by managers. Second,
stock prices can be influenced by speculative factors unrelated to fundamental value, factors highlighted in the recent finance literature on
heterogeneous expectations. Serious risks of unintended negative consequences follow when management decisions are directed to stock
price reactions. It has long been known that financial markets display
more volatility than the volatility in the underlying economy could ever
justify. Asking managers to manage to the market could inject that
higher degree of financial market volatility into the real economy.
Part IV turns to the financial crisis. The fact that management
bears primary responsibility for the crisis does not by itself effect a policy connection between increased shareholder power and regulatory
reform. A connection obtains only if increased shareholder power
would have imported more effective risk management in advance of
the crisis. No plausible grounds exist for making such a case. If anything, the managers responsible had incentives too closely aligned
with those of their shareholders due to equity incentive compensation. Compensation, accordingly, is the topic on which the crisis
holds out a lesson for corporate governance. If trust is to be restored,
equity incentive plans must be restructured to discourage manage-
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ment to the market. Shareholder empowerment, far from getting us
to that result, would get in the way.
I. FRAMING THE ISSUES: THE PREVAILING LEGAL MODEL,
SHAREHOLDER EMPOWERMENT, AND AGENCY COSTS
The prevailing legal model of the corporation privileges the decisionmaking authority of the board of directors. The board, in the
17
classic expression, wields “original and undelegated” powers that follow directly from the organizational form provided by the law rather
than from a delegation of authority from the shareholders. Even
though the shareholders elect the board, they have no right to tell it
18
what to do. They can only proceed indirectly, by removing it or replacing it at the next annual meeting. As a legal matter, directors are
not agents of the shareholders.
Proponents of shareholder empowerment propose an alternative
regime of shareholder choice regarding matters of business policy.
Under their contrasting model of the corporation, the shareholders
19
emerge as principals in an agency relationship. From this point of
view, the board’s decisionmaking power stems from the shareholders’
delegation of that power. It follows that what the shareholders delegate they should also be able to withdraw.
This Article makes a policy case to support the present legal allocation of power. This Part lays out the basic terms of the debate in
which we intervene. We begin, in Section A, by contrasting the economic framework in which we ground our case with the economic
framework that undergirds the case for shareholder empowerment.
Section B lays out shareholder proponents’ law-reform agenda.
A. The Economic Stakes: Trade-Off Versus Win-Win
The shareholder case has historical roots in The Modern Corporation
20
and Private Property, by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means. Berle and
17

People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 94 N.E. 634, 637 (N.Y. 1911) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Hoyt v. Thompson’s Ex’rs, 19 N.Y. 207, 216 (1859)).
18
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2001) (providing for removal of the boards
of directors of Delaware corporations).
19
See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439-40 (2001) (asserting that legal regimes worldwide have converged on corporate law systems characterized by “shared ownership by investors” and
“delegated management” to a board).
20
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1982) (1932).
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Means famously showed that ownership and control of public corporations had separated, charging that resultant management power
needed significant substantive constraint, constraint that earlier in his21
tory had been exercised by shareholder-owners.
We base our case for the prevailing legal model on Eugene Fama
22
and Michael Jensen’s rebuttal of the Berle and Means diagnosis.
Fama and Jensen reframed the separation of ownership and control as
a rational allocation of risk-bearing and decisionmaking functions.
Expertise, access to information, and complexity emerge as neutral,
economic explanations for what Berle and Means described in economic terms as intrinsically problematic and in political terms as illegitimate management empowerment.
1. The Trade-Off
Fama and Jensen substitute contract for property as the mode of
analysis and ask why public corporations have survived in history.
They suggest that organizational contracts must perform two functions: (1) the allocation of the residual claim, and (2) the allocation
23
of decision rights.
In Fama and Jensen’s depiction, shareholders contract for the
right to the net cash flows, thus taking the residual claim. Decision
management and decision control, in contrast, go inside the organization, subject to shareholder retention of the right to vote for the
24
board and matters reserved for their ratification. This holds out an
21

See id. at 124 (“The concentration of economic power separate from ownership
has, in fact, created economic empires, and has delivered these empires into the hands
of a new form of absolutism, relegating ‘owners’ to the position of those who supply
the means whereby the new princes may exercise their power.”).
22
See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26
J.L. & ECON. 301, 301-02 (1983) [hereinafter Fama & Jensen, Separation] (rebutting
Berle and Means’s analysis by arguing that organizations where ownership and control
are separated survive because they benefit from specialization of these roles and are
able to control agency problems by separating “the ratification and monitoring of decisions from initiation and implementation of the decisions”); see also Eugene F. Fama &
Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327, 331-32
(1983) [hereinafter Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems] (recapping the thesis of Fama &
Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, supra, and noting that devices for separating
these roles include “decision hierarchies,” boards of directors, and “incentive structures that encourage mutual monitoring among decision agents”).
23
Fama & Jensen, Separation, supra note 22, at 302. Note that this two-part division
of functions precisely identifies the two contested zones in corporate law’s political
economy.
24
See id. at 313 (explaining that shareholders vote on “auditor choice, mergers,
and new stock issues” in addition to board membership).
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economic advantage: the residual risk holders “are not required to
25
have any other role in the organization.” This frees them to specialize in risk bearing, leaving others to specialize in initiating and im26
plementing business decisions and in monitoring their effectiveness.
The alternative of cutting the shareholders into business decisionmaking could be costly: “[M]ost of the diffuse residual claimants are not
27
qualified for roles in the decision process.” After all, wealth and wil28
lingness to bear risk do not by themselves assure needed skills. It follows that the delegation of decision management and control to ac29
tors inside the corporation is efficient.
Decision rights, thus sent inside the organization, are split between two groups. The powers of initiation and implementation go to
30
management.
Thus management is separated from residual risk
bearing. The reason is agency-cost reduction. Given a complex business organization with knowledge diffusion, business decisionmaking
31
should go to agents with relevant knowledge. At the same time, controls need to be imposed to protect the residual claimants from expropriation by the managers. This second aspect of agency-cost reduction calls for having a separate decision controller to monitor and
32
ratify management decisions. The two decision functions, manage33
ment and monitoring, must be separate “almost by definition.” As a
result, a board of directors that includes outsiders performs the moni34
toring function. The board retains “ultimate control over internal
35
agents” and their decisions and stands in for the classical owner36
entrepreneur of Berle and Means. Backstopping the board as agen-

25

Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems, supra note 22, at 328.
Id. at 330.
27
Fama & Jensen, Separation, supra note 22, at 309.
28
See id. at 312 (commenting that, because managerial skills are not necessarily
tied to wealth or willingness to bear risk, specialization enhances a complex organization’s ability to adapt to changes in the economic environment and lowers the cost of
risk-bearing services).
29
Id. at 309.
30
See id. at 303-04 (defining the activities involved in decision initiation and implementation).
31
See id. at 307-08 (noting that this model reduces agency costs).
32
Id. at 308-09.
33
Id. at 304.
34
See id. at 313, 315 (discussing the incentives of outside directors).
35
Id. at 313.
36
See id. at 309 (“Separation and diffusion of decision management and decision
control—in effect, the absence of a classical entrepreneurial decision maker—limit the
26
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cy-cost controllers are a host of public and private external monitors—
the courts and regulatory agencies on the public side, and the stock
37
market and the takeover market on the private side.
What becomes of ownership in Fama and Jensen’s contractual
model? The model, rather than separating it from control, divides it
up along with control. The classical owner-entrepreneur performs all
three of the functions they identify—-she sets business policy, monitors corporate agents, and bears the residual risk. Fama and Jensen in
effect take these ownership incidents and distribute them across the
organization. The shareholders emerge as owners-in-part, bearing the
residual risk and, as voters, sharing in control at a step removed from
business decisionmaking and direct monitoring. It follows that management and the board share in ownership. This sharing of ownership functions implies nothing radical; it is just a contractual adjustment of the classical model that accounts for the evolution of
corporate law and practice during the twentieth century.
Thus Fama and Jensen rebut the notion that corporate governance is dysfunctional because a traditional shareholder-owner is absent. But the rebuttal, effective though it may be, does not by itself
determine the outcome of today’s contest between the shareholderdirected agency model and the prevailing legal model. It does, however, clear noise from the screen, facilitating a meaningful statement
of the policy issue. The noise comes from the conceptual legacy of
unitary ownership and the teaching that shareholders are owners who
are natural principals in an agency relationship with corporate management. Once the noise is filtered out and the division of ownership
is recognized, the question becomes whether the allocation of authority in public corporations makes economic sense. Fama and Jensen
answer in the affirmative for the reasons just given.
2. The Win-Win
The shareholders’ basic claims can be accessed through Henry
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman’s identification of two touchstone
points that ground a general consensus in their favor: first, “ultimate
control over the corporation should rest with the shareholder[s],” and

power of individual decision agents to expropriate the interests of residual claimants.”).
37
Id. at 312-13.
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second, the market price of the corporation’s stock should provide
38
“the principal measure of its shareholders’ interests.”
39
“Ultimate control” takes us to an agency framework favoring
shareholder inputs. The supporting economic case focuses on agency
costs and incentives. All other things equal, agency-cost reduction
enhances value, and enhanced principal control can conceivably low40
er agency costs. So the question is whether shareholders, as principals, are well suited to provide value-enhancing inputs, or, as Fama and
Jensen asserted, are not well suited.
The suitability case begins with shareholder incentives: their capi41
tal investment in the residual interest lends them an undiluted, pure
42
financial incentive to maximize the value of the firm. From an incentive point of view, shareholders contrast favorably with managers
and independent directors, whose incentives are comprised by interests in compensation and job retention.
The question then becomes whether these pure shareholder incentives can be harnessed by the governance system despite the fact
that dispersed, diversified shareholders labor under information
asymmetries and lack business expertise. Hansmann and Kraakman’s
second proposition—that the market price of the stock provides the
“principal measure” of the shareholder interest—holds out the means
to this end. If the stock price provides an objective and accurate
38

Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 440-41.
The phrase “ultimate control” is imprecise. The assertion in the text reflects
our interpretation. The legal model already vests the franchise in the shareholders
and directs the board to manage in their interests. Arguably, this amounts to an allocation of “ultimate control.” Hansmann and Kraakman accordingly imply more in the
way of shareholder authority. To see why, compare Hansmann and Kraakman’s conception to that of Fama and Jensen, who assign “ultimate control” to the board of directors, subject to the shareholder vote. See Fama & Jensen, Separation, supra note 22,
at 313. This would not suffice for Hansmann and Kraakman, for whom “ultimate control” at a minimum means shareholder choice on tender offers, as they consider trustbased outcomes favoring management discretion to be inefficient. See Hansmann &
Kraakman, supra note 19, at 467. Even as today’s shareholder agenda goes much
farther, the term “ultimate control” easily accommodates it.
40
See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 1, at 16 (asserting that
“[s]hareholder rights serve the critical function of reducing . . . agency costs” and that
inadequate shareholder rights cause shares to trade at a discount to fundamental value).
41
See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2001,
at 121, 138 (“[I]f resources are to shift . . . the market may have a role to play in funneling capital toward the new companies.”).
42
See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 449 (“[I]f the control rights
granted to the firm’s equity-holders are exclusive and strong, they will have powerful
incentives to maximize the value of the firm.”).
39
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measure of the purely motivated shareholder directive to maximize
value, it provides the best source of instructions for governance and
business policy. After all, it is in the financial market where shareholders, using the Holmstrom and Kaplan metaphor, “put their mon43
ey where their mouth is.” From this it follows that a manager-agent
44
with correct incentives should manage to the market price.
Thus do the shareholder proponents contemplate a species of
45
market control. They want the market price—which is, after all, set
by shareholders investing at the margin—to be the ongoing and determining source of shareholder input. It bids those managers who
are effective agents to manage to the stock market in formulating
business policy, thereby accessing the high-quality instructions embedded in stock market prices. With the market price as the management
yardstick, value-enhancing opportunities to merge, sell, or dissolve will
no longer be frustrated by the managers’ desire to hold on to control;
resources will no longer be misdirected to suboptimal executive compensation plans; and governance arrangements will import appropri46
ate constraints and incentives. Managing to the market price also is
thought to import administrative coherence, because the yardstick
47
provides a means with which to evaluate management performance.
Value maximization pursued with a long-term time horizon is said
48
to follow. Here the proponents refer to basic principles of valuation,
43

Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 41, at 138; see also George W. Dent, Jr., Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and Director Primacy Models of Corporate Governance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1213, 1225 (2008) (“Although share prices do not exactly
match fundamental value, no measure is better.”).
44
This Article continues a line of analysis that begins in Michael L. Wachter, Takeover Defense When Financial Markets Are (Only) Relatively Efficient, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 787
(2003).
45
See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 1, at 16 (asserting that
strengthened “shareholder rights go hand in hand with reduced regulation [and] litigation”).
46
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833, 840, 850 (2005) (noting that, in the absence of shareholder intervention,
management tends not to adopt “game-ending decisions” because such decisions also
end the managers’ control).
47
See Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 41, at 138-39 (explaining that long-term
management effects, especially in times of change, are difficult to measure absent
share prices).
48
See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 451 (“The ability of standardmodel firms to expand rapidly in growth industries is magnified . . . by access to
institutional investors and the international equity markets . . . . Over time, then, the
standard model is likely to win the competitive struggle on the margins . . . . As the
pace of technological change continues to quicken, this competitive advantage should
continue to increase.”).
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which teach that long-term value is impounded in the present market
49
price. It follows that managing to the market price is incentive compatible with regard to the time horizon because both short-term and
50
long-term investors have incentives to maximize long-term value.
Shareholder proponents do not deny that the market price is set
under conditions of information asymmetry and thus is not fully in51
formed. The implied assertion is that any resulting divergence between market price and fundamental value will not hold out perverse
effects, given management to the market price. An ameliorating factor
has also been noted: some studies show that market prices have be52
come better informed over the past half century. The information
gap between those inside and outside of the corporation has narrowed,
due in part to stricter mandatory disclosure requirements and in part to
53
more liquid markets and a larger sector of information intermediaries.
Summing up, shareholder proponents seek to reform the prevailing legal model of the corporation (or what might be called the “Fama-Jensen corporation”) to ensure that shareholder inputs directly
impact both business decisionmaking and monitoring. The supporting theoretical case rests upon three assumptions: first, that information asymmetries can be ignored (or alternatively, that managers cannot be trusted to use their superior knowledge in the best interest of
the corporation); second, that business instructions following from
pure financial incentives have agency-cost reductive effects; and, third,
that the market price accurately communicates these instructions.

49

See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain
Search for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 522 (2002) (explaining that intrinsic or
“hidden” value can be assessed by a board but is invisible to shareholders).
50
In the view of shareholder proponents, accountability suffers under the prevailing
regime, leading to inefficient regulatory responses, including shareholder litigation. See
COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 1, at 16, 93-96. Therefore, systemic
reform designed to facilitate shareholder intervention is appropriate because the inherited model affords management discretionary space to disregard the price directive.
51
See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–
2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1548-63 (2007)
(discussing the factors that have narrowed the scope of information asymmetry and
thereby increased stock price information, but not suggesting perfect symmetry).
52
For a description of the empirical literature, which focuses on an increase in
idiosyncratic volatility, see infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
53
See Gordon, supra note 51, at 1548-63 (attributing stock prices’ increased information value to SEC and Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) disclosure
regulations, as well as to the rise in investment analysts and information-dissemination
mechanisms).
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B. The Law-Reform Agenda
The shareholders’ law-reform agenda took shape in response to
the takeover wars of the 1980s. State lawmakers and state courts, in
particular the Delaware courts, responded to the outbreak of hostile
activity by restating and reinforcing the legal model’s allocation of au54
thority to management. The shareholder case coalesced as a protest
against that outcome, and the context was ideally suited to the shareholder position. Recall that Fama and Jensen defended the legal
model on the assumption that a vigorous market for corporate control
55
operated as a check on subpar managers. If courts and legislatures
had impaired that market’s operation, the impairments needed to be
removed. Moreover, the takeover context minimized the importance
of the shareholders’ debilities respecting information and expertise.
In the information-enriched environment created by the disclosure
requirements of a contested battle for control, shareholders were
deemed informed enough to choose rationally between the value of
56
two or more competing corporate strategies.
Furthermore, shareholders were seen as having been on the right
side of the era’s valuation questions. The capital markets emerged
54

This response raised questions about the terms of fiduciary duty. It took a decade and four famous cases before the Delaware courts delivered a definitive answer respecting the scope of the fiduciary duty. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d
1361, 1388 (Del. 1995) (ruling that refusal to redeem a poison pill survives review if it is
neither “preclusive” nor “coercive” and falls within a “range of reasonableness”); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989) (sustaining the
“just say no” defense based on a business plan implemented by the board of directors);
Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1351-57 (Del. 1985) (sustaining the poison pill as a structural matter and applying Unocal scrutiny); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955-56 (Del. 1985) (applying proportionality scrutiny to
management defense tactics). When the answer finally came, trust trumped agency,
forcing hostile offerors to resort to the shareholder franchise in the form of a proxy
fight for board control in order to put to the shareholders the choice between the offer
price and management’s claim that its business plan held out greater value on a longterm basis. That is, the board was left with the power to block offers to protect the business plan, thereby remitting the exercise of shareholder choice not to the market for
shares but to the exercise of the franchise. See Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Sales
and Elections as Methods for Transferring Corporate Control, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
783, 788 (2001) (emphasizing that, because of the ubiquity of the poison pill, corporate
control changes occur principally by election rather than through the market).
55
See supra text accompanying notes 30-37.
56
The Delaware courts disagreed even so, channeling the contested control transaction into the even richer information environment of the proxy contest. See Paramount
Commc’ns, 571 A.2d at 1154-55 (permitting a corporation’s board of directors to forgo
unsolicited tender offers it perceives as threats to corporate policy despite shareholder
support, thereby forcing a bidder to use alternative means of acquiring control).
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from the 1980s with an enhanced reputation as drivers of productivity.
The era’s corporate restructurings were deemed to have been a productive success. It followed that capital markets had a comparative
advantage over appointed managers in effecting structural reforms
57
necessitated by deregulation and technological change. Firms tend
to be experts in existing technologies, products, and processes. Markets came to be thought to have the advantage when it comes to recognizing the implications of new technologies, products, and
processes—the markets move the capital to higher-valuing users who
58
then put the capital into more productive projects.
Shareholder empowerment emerged from the takeover era as the
leading issue in corporate law, with a consistent consensus in its favor.
The list of agenda items continued to grow during the period of institutional adjustment that followed. The shareholders, dissatisfied with
the legal outcome and led by now-dominant institutions, lost their pas59
sivity. “Governance” became a zone of ongoing engagement between
managers, institutional shareholders, and a new class of professional
intermediaries. Independent boards of directors assumed greater in60
stitutional salience.
61
Even so, shareholder empowerment remained elusive and so
emerged as the focus of a law-reform agenda. If the shareholders could
57

See Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 41, at 122 (“The real drivers behind the
increased dominance of capital markets . . . can be traced to deregulation . . . and to
new information and communication technologies . . . .”). We note that while
Holmstrom and Kaplan expect the 1980s experience of market advantage to persist
over time, they also acknowledge the possibility of changed conditions under which
market price guidance could lose its productive quality. See id. at 140-41 (suggesting
that if stock markets slow, reliance on them may also decrease).
58
See id. at 137-38 (“Markets are more effective than managers when it comes to
moving capital from declining industries to emerging industries.”); cf. Hansmann &
Kraakman, supra note 19, at 450-51 (noting that shareholder input will favor aggressive
development of new product markets and abandonment of inefficient investments).
59
Shareholders can be counted on to vote against antitakeover amendments and in
favor of redeeming poison pills. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop
Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 898
(2002) (noting that, when possible, shareholders prevented the adoption of “takeoverinhibiting charter amendments” while voting in favor of proposals to redeem poison pills).
60
See Gordon, supra note 51, at 1511 (noting the “increasingly tight link between
the independent board and the priority of shareholder value”).
61
The post-takeover era began with a vision of direct institutional investor control
through aggressive use of the shareholder franchise. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder
Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 525, 585-89 (1990) (discussing shareholder
monitoring as a concept that had not yet come to fruition and analyzing factors that
influence whether shareholders remain apathetic or not). It was hoped that institutional holdings had reached a level of concentration that would render collective ac-
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not surmount collective action problems themselves, then law reform
directed at lowering the costs and expanding the payoffs of shareholder
intervention made sense. Today’s shareholder law-reform agenda
serves these dual purposes.
Proposals on the agenda fall into two categories. The first, a narrower category, accepts the existing legal model in its broad outline
and focuses on process reforms designed to expand the range of
shareholder choices in the election process and to facilitate shareholder contests. The second type would give the shareholders the option to legislate their way out of the prevailing model, to an agency
model holding out direct control of business policy. Cost concerns
are present in both categories. Some reforms are designed to enhance the impact of existing low-cost activist strategies like “just vote
no” campaigns. All of the rest include transfers from the corporate
treasury to intervening shareholders.
The list of improvements proposed for the present election system
is lengthy. The first items are designed to facilitate rejection of selected candidates and protest voting. These include majority (as opposed to plurality) voting and confidential voting, both of which have
62
already been adopted voluntarily by many corporations. Reformers
tion barriers surmountable, with U.S. institutions stepping into the role played by
blockholders in other governance systems. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 863, 884-88 (1991) (suggesting that institutional investors could organize on a
subscription basis and fund correctly incentivized candidates for board seats). But no
such movement to self-help by spontaneous order occurred. Far from yielding, collective action barriers instead emerged much reinforced in the new environment. The
free-rider problem continued to discourage investment managers from incurring the
costs of governance challenges—gains that must be shared with competitors who do
not share the costs do not advance investment managers’ careers. See Jill E. Fisch, Relationship Investing: Will It Happen? Will It Work?, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1009, 1019-25 (1994)
(discussing the free-rider problem as disincentivizing investors from monitoring because the benefits spread to competitive investors but the cost is only borne by the
monitor); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder
Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 473-74 (1991) (acknowledging that money managers have no
selective incentives to actively improve diversified funds because doing so would simultaneously benefit the managers to whom they are compared).
At the same time, many fund advisors sell services to managers, importing an independent business reason to stay cooperative. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director
Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1751-54 (2006) (describing the incentive problems of financial institutions). Finally, mutual fund investors can
redeem at any time, inhibiting investment in large, illiquid blockholder positions that
would carry boardroom influence.
62
See CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, STUDY OF MAJORITY VOTING IN DIRECTOR ELECTIONS, at viii
(2007), http://www.ngelaw.com/files/upload/majoritystudy111207.pdf (demonstrating
that majority voting has become standard practice among large public companies).
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want shareholders to have the option of a “no” vote (as opposed to the
present “withhold” vote expression of negativity) and a right to re63
place all incumbents every two or three years. Other provisions hold
out more in the way of power shifting. They would clear a way for
shareholder nomination of board candidates, not only by opening
access to the proxy statement but by providing for reimbursement of
64
solicitation expenses.
The second legislative category is more radical. The shareholders
65
already have the power to amend the bylaws under state codes. But,
66
even cabined in a tight zone of process-based subject matter, the power
has been unexercised because shareholders, while they do have the power to put a bylaw amendment to a shareholders’ meeting, have neither
access to management’s proxy statement nor state law power to trump
67
contrary board-adopted bylaws. The reformers would grant both.
At the same time, there are definite limits on what can be accomplished through bylaw amendment. Bylaws are limited to process
matters and cannot surmount the reservation to the board of the
power to manage the business, a reservation read broadly by the De68
laware courts. Only a charter amendment can delimit the board’s
69
powers, and state corporate codes accord the board agenda control
63

See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675,
700-04 (2007) (suggesting these election reforms as part of a broader reform scheme
to make directors accountable to shareholders).
64
See id. at 696-700 (noting that threshold requirements would be needed). For
the SEC’s recent proposal, see Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed.
Reg. 29,024 (proposed June 18, 2009) (to be codified in scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.),
and supra note 15 and accompanying text.
65
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2001) (granting shareholders the power
to adopt, amend, or repeal bylaws even when directors share this power).
66
See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 231-40 (Del.
2008) (answering questions certified from the SEC regarding a proposed bylaw that
improperly sought to “remove the subject of election expense reimbursement” from
the board’s discretion).
67
See Bebchuk, supra note 63, at 707-11 (arguing that shareholder-adopted bylaws
should be facilitated while boards’ power to adopt bylaws should be constrained). The
SEC’s current proposed rules include a limited bylaw access provision, keyed to
“shareholder proposals that would amend, or that request an amendment to, a company’s governing documents regarding nomination procedures or disclosures related
to shareholder nominations . . . .” Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74
Fed. Reg. at 29,024.
68
See CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 232 (noting that shareholders lack the broad management power statutorily allocated to the board of directors).
69
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(a)(2) (“[A] corporation may amend its certificate of incorporation . . . [t]o change, substitute, enlarge or diminish the nature of its
business or corporate powers and purposes . . . .”).
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70

over charter amendments. The agency reformers accordingly would
open the door to shareholder-initiated charter amendments and accord power to initiate a change of jurisdiction of incorporation, with
71
expense reimbursement. They contemplate that once the door is
opened, shareholders can allocate to themselves the power to force a
72
sale or liquidation of the firm, or to force a large dividend (and the
73
leveraged financing thereof) or a subsidiary spin-off. Present proposals respecting business policy stop at this point. But we note an
implicit open end: once any door to the reversal of board business
judgment is opened, there will be no principled basis for containing
shareholder mandates respecting business policy.
Finally, “say on pay” initiatives would similarly allow the shareholders to cross the line to control of business policy, but in ratification mode and on a mandated annual basis. Here the idea is to put
the top executives’ total compensation package to the shareholders
74
for an up/down advisory vote.
C. Summary
The shareholders’ reform agenda reflects their view that the prevailing model is out of date. By hypothesis, it remained defensible only so long as collective action problems rendered shareholder exercise
of discretionary powers infeasible. But, as we have seen, concentrated
institutional shareholdings have not by themselves removed this barrier. Accordingly, if the firm is to be reconstituted along agency
75
lines, the shareholder collective action problem must first be solved
by changing the terms of shareholding itself through a system of subsidies for activists. With that accomplished, the shareholders would get
the power to opt out of the prevailing model on a firm-by-firm basis.

70

See id. § 242(b)(1) (“Every amendment authorized by subsection (a) . . . shall be
made . . . in the following manner: . . . [the] board of directors shall adopt a resolution
setting forth the amendment proposed . . . .”).
71
See Bebchuk, supra note 46, at 865-70 (suggesting that shareholders should be
empowered to change things like the corporate charter and the state of incorporation).
72
See id. at 895-901 (addressing the effects on agency costs of shareholder power
to participate in “game-ending” decisions).
73
See id. at 901-08 (analyzing the impact of shareholder power to make “scalingdown” decisions).
74
Initiatives presently on Washington reform agendas fall into the first, narrower category addressed to the shareholder franchise. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
75
See Black, supra note 61, at 608 (noting that shareholder voice is an idea that has
never been tried, rather than an idea that has failed).
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Significantly, the shareholder proponents do not anticipate that
these reforms would open the door to hundreds of issue-based proxy
contests. They instead point to an in terrorem effect. They project
that the threat of shareholder intervention by itself will influence management conduct, forcing managers to focus on the stock price in order to avoid triggering destabilizing and disempowering shareholder
76
action.
77
The projection is fair. But therein lies the problem. The shareholder proponents dismiss the prevailing legal model too quickly,
76

See Bebchuk, supra note 46, at 878 (“Introducing the [shareholder] power to
intervene would induce management to act differently in order to avoid shareholder
intervention.”).
77
In making this projection, shareholder proponents effectively respond to a
point made by their critics, who warn that pure financial incentives posited by shareholder proponents will not obtain efficiency in all cases and that empowered activists
may have private agendas. See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 586-93 (2006) (explaining how the interests of certain types of shareholders may differ from the interests of others). Since the bite lies
in the threat, any problems of self-dealing can be dealt with by fiduciary law, and any
incentive misalignments in actual contests will come out and impact the vote. Note
also that if the bite lies in the threat, any shareholder incentive problems will be minimal because the shareholders who actually wield the power will be the market price
setters, actors who do indeed act with undiluted incentives to maximize value.
The critics make two additional points. First, they project governance incoherence in the move from oligarchic to democratic governance, citing information
asymmetries and conflicting interests within the group of newly empowered constituents. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 61, at 1745 (citing KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 68-70 (1974)) (arguing that authority-based decisionmaking
structures, grounded in central agencies empowered to make binding decisions, are
necessary when the organization’s constituencies suffer from information asymmetries
and have differing interests). Second, they predict that shareholder empowerment will
impose a short-term time horizon with consequent perverse effects. See, e.g., Anabtawi,
supra, at 579-80 (noting how pressure from short-term shareholders can cause companies to neglect long-term focus).
Shareholder proponents similarly rely on the market price to rebut the first criticism. They pose the market price as the focal point for decisionmaking, thereby obviating any coherence problem. If the market price is indeed suited to guide business
policymaking, the shareholder proponents win this point. Emphasis accordingly needs
to be directed away from theories of government to financial economics, where the
inquiry should focus on the interplay between information asymmetry, investor expectations, and market pricing. We conduct this inquiry in Part III. This analysis also applies to the short-term time-horizon objection. Under basic principles of valuation,
short-term and long-term investors both have incentives to maximize long-term value,
and the market price subsumes all time horizons—short, intermediate, and long. See
Black & Kraakman, supra note 49, at 532-33 (asserting that “even short-term investors
have an incentive to maximize the firm’s long-term value, because only by doing so can
they maximize the price at which long-term investors will buy the shares that the shortterm investors will soon want to sell”). If the market price does so accurately, then
there should be no perverse effects.
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eliding two critical points. The first of these is taken up in Part II.
There we show that in the years since the takeover era, the legal model has proven highly responsive to shareholder interests and demands,
ameliorating agency costs. The second point is addressed in Part III.
The shareholders, even as they plausibly expect that an agency model
would further reduce agency costs, fail to confront new costs that
would result from the change, in particular suboptimal results stemming from managing to the market. In our view, once these countervailing points are on the table, the shareholder empowerment case
falls well short of surmounting the burden of proof that ordinarily
confronts proposals for fundamental structural change.
II. SYSTEMIC RESPONSIVENESS
We have seen that the shareholder proponents’ win-win scenario
predicts that shareholder empowerment will cause agency costs to decline and capital to flow to the best use, and that agency costs will
persist absent shareholder empowerment. Agency-cost reduction and
shareholder empowerment move in lockstep in this picture—you do
not get one without the other. This sine qua non posits constant,
highly salient agency costs and claims that fundamental law reform is
the only way to reduce them. This in turn implies that the corporate
governance system leaves big money on the table in the ordinary
course, a proposition that to us is counterintuitive.
This Part challenges the shareholder sine qua non. Our challenge
follows from the lesson Jensen and Meckling taught in their classic
work on agency costs: institutions change in response to market incentives. In Jensen and Meckling’s framework, managers and shareholders address agency costs as they arise over time, in the managers’
case by bonding their fidelity and in the shareholders’ case by moni78
toring their investments. To the extent agency costs remain unaddressed, it is because they are too costly for the parties to remove
79
themselves. Agency-cost reduction, then, is as much an endogenous
incident of the system’s operation as are agency costs themselves. A
prediction results for corporate governance: as new agency costs apThus, the shareholder proponents rely entirely on the robustness of the market
price of the stock as a predictor of fundamental value.
78
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
79
See id. (explaining how many agency costs can be avoided through principal
monitoring and agent bonding expenditures, and referring to the remaining agency
costs as the “residual loss”).

BRATTONWACHTER_FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

676

2/16/2010 1:04 PM

[Vol. 158: 653

pear, we can expect the system to find ways to reduce them, even as a
residual component of agency costs will persist in the wake of the system’s adjustments.
The shareholder sine qua non, in contrast, follows from a static
picture of agency costs and corporate governance institutions. This
holds that managers will systematically fail to maximize value in predictable ways. They will favor conservative, low-leverage capital structures, misinvest excess cash in suboptimal projects, fail to reduce
excess operating costs, and resist premium sales of control. All of
these missed opportunities amount to agency costs that could be reduced if the law provided for greater shareholder input.
This fixed picture of systemic shortcomings derives less from economic theory than from a particular time and governance context.
The time was the 1980s, and the context was the debate over hostile
takeovers. At the time, the management predilection for institutional
stability had significant negative implications for productivity, with an
open playing field for hostile bids as the agency-cost corrective of
80
choice. This Part uses Jensen and Meckling’s framework as a lens for
reviewing subsequent history, contending that the corporate governance system has been dynamic rather than static in addressing agency costs. Indeed, developments on the front lines of business practice
have led to a series of agency-cost-reductive changes. We use four critical examples to indicate that recent history bears out the JensenMeckling prediction of responsive agency-cost reduction both by actors inside corporations and actors in the financial markets. First,
managers emerged from the 1980s sensitized to the benefits of shareholder-value maximization even as the board of directors emerged as
a more robust monitoring institution. Hostile takeovers lost their
place at the cutting edge of corporate governance as a result. Second,
the revival of private equity buyouts showed that disciplinary merger
activity can proliferate even in the absence of either actual or threatened hostile bids. Third, the appearance of hedge fund activists
showed, much to the surprise of many, that the prevailing legal model
of the shareholder franchise can be well suited to shareholder intervention. Finally, a shareholder-directed break in a longstanding pattern of corporate cash payouts accompanied the hedge funds’ appearance.

80

See, e.g., Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of “Discounted” Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 897-901 (1988)
(offering two hypotheses on the sources of discounted share prices).
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Cumulated, these developments show that the governance system
works dynamically within the prevailing legal model to remove money
on the table stemming from excess agency costs. Shareholder empowerment proponents have played an important role in this process by
exerting continuing pressure on directors and managers. They are
deservedly applauded for their efforts (as are directors and managers
who weigh in against them in the public debate). Even so, a question
arises as to the need for greater shareholder empowerment.
A. Corporate Governance and the Market for Corporate Control
We start with an evolutionary account of the corporate governance system put forward by Bengt Holmstrom and Steven Kaplan in
2001. They surveyed the evolution of shareholder-manager relations,
noting that a regime of market-oriented corporate governance
emerged in the wake of the 1980s. They depicted the takeover wars as
a reaction to an external shock caused by economic factors such as
deregulation, globalization, and new information and communications technologies. The financial markets, they observed, showed a
comparative advantage over management in undertaking the struc81
tural adjustments made necessary by the changes. Viewed from this
perspective, the shift to market control followed neither from its intrinsic superiority respecting capital allocation nor from a structurally
embedded level of excess agency costs but from transitory economic
82
A different economic environment, said Holmstrom and
factors.
83
Kaplan, could trigger a shift away from the markets.

81

Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 41, at 122-23.
See id. at 137 (suggesting that “markets have come to play a bigger role not because they have become better at allocating capital and not because managers misbehaved, but rather because the market’s comparative advantage has been favored by
economy-wide trends in deregulation, globalization, and information technologies”).
83
In discussing potential future developments, Holmstrom and Kaplan stated,
82

We have argued that at least some of the efficiency gains associated with these
changes can be traced to the comparative advantage of markets in undertaking large-scale change. Since these effects are temporary, it is possible that the
current level of market influence on the governance and organization of firms
is going to abate. It is not hard to build a scenario in which the pursuit of
shareholder value becomes a less important guideline to managers in the next
few years. . . . If the stock markets are flat or down for the next few years, then
the extensive reliance on stock options may again dissipate, leading managers
to have less focus on stock prices.
Id. at 140.
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For Holmstrom and Kaplan, the takeover shock in turn caused a
governance response: shareholder-oriented economic assumptions
took hold within corporate boardrooms. Incentive realignment was
essential in bringing this about, and the move to equity-based management compensation duly encouraged managers to see things the
shareholders’ way. Thus, restructuring found its way into strategic
business planning in the ordinary course. Corporate governance practices changed, too, with the emergence of the independent monitoring
board. By all available indicators, the move to board independence
84
and more vigorous monitoring continues unabated.
Significantly, none of this required any changes in the prevailing
legal model. The emergence of the independent board did occasion
some pushing and shoving in the private sector, manifested in the ges85
tation of the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project.
But it can still be fairly described as a joint effort by directors and investors seeking best corporate practices. Regulatory mandates came after
86
the fact. The system, in sum, became more cognizant of the need to
87
reduce agency costs, with private ordering as the means to the end.
Hostile takeovers decreased in policy salience as the market context changed. Merger volume reached new records, and the transac88
tions were overwhelmingly friendly. Managers proved willing to sell.
84

See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs 37-46 (Eur. Corp. Governance
Inst., Law Working Paper No. 116/2008, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1281516 (surveying the range of pertinent empirical measures of changes in boards of
directors). We make the same assertion respecting section 162(m) of the Internal
Revenue Code, enacted in 1994, which limits the corporate tax deductability of salaries
to $1 million. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006). Had the governance system not changed its
views first, we doubt it would have occurred to Congress to add the section.
85
See Jonathan R. Macey, The Transformation of the American Law Institute, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1212, 1218 (1993) (describing conflicting views between the American
Law Institute and corporate management).
86
The stock exchange rules mandating committees arrived only after Enron.
These, for the first time, hard-wire the majority-independent board of directors. N.Y.
STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.01 (2009), available at http://
nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM/Sections (follow “Section 3” hyperlink). Not only is an
independent director majority now mandated, but independence is formally defined.
Id. § 303A.02. Accompanying mandates include separate meetings for outside directors and for all independent nominating, compensation, and audit committees. Id.
§§ 303A.03–.06.
87
Thus did Hansmann and Kraakman declare an end to corporate law history at
the new century’s start. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 439 (“There is
no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally
strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”).
88
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 59, at 878-80, 879 tbl.2 (detailing trends in M&A
activity from 1988 to 2000).
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Stock options and exit compensation provided a carrot, and majorityindependent boards held out a stick in the form of a rising rate of
89
CEO dismissals. Hostility became less a fundamental transactional
distinction and more a secondary strategy choice determined by cost90
benefit calculations at the acquiring firm. The hostile offer’s diminishing importance is further confirmed by the diminishing incidence
of defensive devices in corporate contracts. Staggered boards (which
together with poison pills afford the maximum available protection)
among S&P 100 companies declined from 44% to 16% between 2003
and 2008; the decline among S&P 500 companies was from 57% in
91
2003 to 36% in 2007.
Meanwhile, the private equity buyout is the segment of the mergers and acquisitions market most likely to entail the post-closing governance discipline sought by the shareholder camp, a segment that
experienced a remarkable revival beginning in the mid-1990s. Buyout
firms act as aggressive blockholders, closely monitoring management
92
performance and imposing performance targets. The private equity
business model includes and depends on an active threat of manager
removal even as it includes and depends on the participation of management incumbents and incentivizes them with a share of the equity.
Leverage enhances the threat by interpolating the possibility of down93
side disaster and magnifying the financial payoff for success. Discipline, accordingly, is wrought into these companies’ governance structures. Pre-closing hostility, however, is avoided. When the recent
buyout boom peaked in 2006, buyouts comprised forty-two percent of
94
total merger activity as measured by number of transactions.
All of this shows the corporate governance system acting out the
Jensen and Meckling model. Managers bonded themselves by playing
89

See id. at 881-84 (describing the effects of having independent board members).
See G. William Schwert, Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder?, 55 J. FIN.
2599, 2600 (2000) (suggesting that “the distinction between hostile and friendly offers
is largely a reflection of negotiation strategy”).
91
Kahan & Rock, supra note 84, at 21-22. The trend of decline is also evident in
smaller firms, but the magnitude is less—in 2007, 58% of S&P 400 mid-cap firms and
55% of S&P 600 small-cap firms had staggered boards. Id. at 22.
92
See Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity 9 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 082/2007, 2007), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=982114 (noting that “management will be forced to adhere to strict,
results-oriented financial projections”).
93
See id. (observing that “[t]he overall result is a more dynamic and challenging
boardroom style than prevails in public companies”).
94
William W. Bratton, Private Equity’s Three Lessons for Agency Theory, 9 EUR. BUS.
ORG. L. REV. 509, 513 fig.1 (2008).
90
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ball with the independent board, aligning their personal wealth with
that of the shareholders and, in a growing number of cases, giving up
their takeover defenses. Investors simultaneously stepped up their
monitoring. Agency-cost reduction was the end in view on both sides.
The market power that first registered in the conflicts of the 1980s
95
continued to register, but in a more cooperative framework. Shareholder value creation became embedded in corporate practice under
the prevailing legal model. No fundamental, facilitative legal change
96
was needed.
A shareholder proponent might counter these observations by
noting that legally sanctioned antitakeover measures increase the costs
of takeovers and thereby diminish the intensity of market discipline
and lead to increased agency costs. That point certainly carries for
97
some firms at some times. But the Jensen and Meckling model antic95

See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance:
What’s Right and What’s Wrong? 7-8 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 23/2003, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=441100 (“[T]he accomplishments of the 1980s were by no means forgotten. By the 1990s U.S. managers,
boards, and institutional shareholders had seen what LBOs and other market-driven
restructurings could do.”).
96
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 59, at 897-99 (observing that “the use of adaptive
devices seems to work reasonably well”).
97
We note, however, that empirical results on the economic effects of takeover
defenses across the board are mixed. The literature on takeover defenses provides a
good example of the empirical back-and-forth. Many assert that takeover vulnerability
influences stock prices even today. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick compared portfolios
made up of firms with “strong” and “weak” shareholder protections (with “weak” including antitakeover protection) and showed that, between 1990 and 1998, a long position in strong-protection firms and a short position in weak-protection firms would
have earned an annual abnormal return of 8.5%. Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew
Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 144 (2003). Bebchuk and Cohen conducted a subsequent test focused on the staggered board, which,
together with the ubiquitous poison pill, makes for a state-of-the-art defensive barrier.
They show a statistically significant reduction in firm value at the 99% confidence level.
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409,
421 (2005). They also test for economic significance, finding that a staggered board
lowers Tobin’s Q by 17 points. Id. at 424. A number of complementary studies show
connections between antitakeover provisions and specific undesirable results—bad
mergers, higher wages, and low management turnover. See Kenneth A. Borokhovich,
Kelly R. Brunarski & Robert Parrino, CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments, 52 J.
FIN. 1495, 1496 (1997) (correlating antitakeover adoption and higher levels of compensation); Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Corporate Governance and Acquirer
Returns, 62 J. FIN. 1851, 1883 (2007) (studying 3333 acquisitions from 1990 to 2003 and
showing lower abnormal bidder returns for firms with antitakeover provisions, controlling for product market competition, equity-based pay, institutional ownership, and
board characteristics); Wayne H. Mikkelson & M. Megan Partch, The Decline of Takeovers
and Disciplinary Managerial Turnover, 44 J. FIN. ECON. 205, 206 (1997) (comparing
management turnover in two periods, 1984–1988 and 1989–1993).
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ipates these costs, too, with its residuum of irreducible agency costs.
Given all of the adjustments described above, it is hard to project a revival for the hostile takeover, quite apart from the costs incident to antitakeover regulation.
B. New Blockholders
Shareholders who own large blocks of stock suffer no lack of empowerment, whether they own controlling blocks or noncontrolling
blocks of sufficient size to assure board representation and inside influence. Shareholder proponents have long bemoaned the relative
absence of these blockholders in U.S. equity capital structures, speculating that they might, if we had them, make up the disciplinary deficit
under the prevailing legal model. They once looked to blockholding
arrangements in corporate governance systems in other countries to
None of this is conclusive. Endogeneity problems prevent the studies from proving conclusively that antitakeover provisions cause lower stock prices. Gompers, Ishii,
and Metrick’s abnormal positive returns could represent unanticipated benefits of
good governance or may reflect environmental changes unrelated to governance. See
Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton & Ailsa Röell, Corporate Governance and Control 43 (Eur.
Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 02/2002, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=343461 (warning of the limitations of Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick’s findings). In addition, the market may take antitakeover provisions as a signal of poor management quality or a lack of shareholder orientation. See John C.
Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence, 79
TEX. L. REV. 271, 301-02 (2000) (acknowledging that market reaction to antitakeover
measures will depend on investors’ prior beliefs about management and shareholder
orientation). Other unobservable variables may be in play. Market actors may simply
overestimate the salience of the takeover threat. Chief executives may do the same
thing. Finally, a study of the performance of the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick portfolio
after 2003 reverses the performance result, suggesting that the original result was sensitive to the distinct performance patterns of technology firms during the study period.
John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Tjomme O. Rusticus, Does Weak Governance Cause Weak
Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Investors’ Expectations, 61 J.
FIN. 655, 681-84 (2006) (showing that the poor-governance-performance portfolio outperformed the good-governance-performance portfolio during 2000–2003, and finding
no evidence of a causal relationship between governance and operating performance).
It should also be noted that other studies of takeover defenses reach the opposite
conclusion. One study of the subsequent performance of firms adopting takeover defenses finds no performance decline. See Mark S. Johnson & Ramesh P. Rao, The Impact of Antitakeover Amendments on Corporate Financial Performance, 32 FIN. REV. 659, 660,
669 (1997) (surveying a range of financial measures with respect to more than 600 antitakeover amendments adopted between 1979 and 1985 and finding no adverse effect). Later performance improvement has even been detected. See Laura Casares
Field & Jonathan M. Karpoff, Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms, 57 J. FIN. 1857, 1883 (2002)
(comparing initial public offering (IPO) firms with and without takeover defenses and
finding that defenseless firms underperform for the first two years but that there are
no significant performance differences thereafter).
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see if conditions favorable to blockholding could be replicated here,
98
but without success. Yet, in recent years, after all hope seemed lost,
homegrown blockholders did appear, but not in the form predicted.
Activist hedge funds broke the mold. They take significant equity
stakes in target companies—generally five to fifteen percent of the
target’s stock is the range. They mount hostile challenges to managers and business plans at publicly traded firms worldwide. They are
impatient shareholders, who look for value and want it realized in the
near or intermediate term. They tell managers how to realize the value and challenge publicly those who resist the advice, using the proxy
contest as a threat. The strategy proved successful during the bull
99
market run up to 2008. The leading empirical study looks at the period 2001 to 2006 and pairs 236 activist hedge funds with 1059 public100
ly traded targets. These activist engagements persist, albeit in dimi101
nished numbers since the financial collapse.
Whether the number
of targets rises or falls in the future is unclear, because an upward

98

See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 223-24 (1994) (discussing how U.S. concentration
trends slowed in the early 1980s and how, in the 1990s, they were only moving slightly
toward the large blocks present in Japan and Germany); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, Investment Companies as Guardian Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the
Corporate Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1006-09 (1993) (mentioning several
empirical studies that show a “mildly positive relationship between active large-block
shareholders and corporate performance”). It turned out that the incentives that supported blockholding abroad could not be replicated domestically. Path dependencies
within the system retarded its adaptability. At the same time, blockholding in other
countries followed from their different political environments, particularly their
stronger social democratic systems. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory
of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 169
(1999) (positing that path dependence causes advanced economies to differ in their
ownership structure, despite pressures to converge); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution
in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 644-46 (1996) (describing how both path
dependence and chaos theory account for variations in institutions, within a range of
acceptable economic efficiency).
99
See, e.g., Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1739-45 (2008) (listing and discussing five motives for hedge
fund activism and describing two examples of activist events).
100
Id. at 1739.
101
See, e.g., Josh Hyatt, Getting Smaller, But Not Quieter, CFO, Feb. 2009, at 17 (discussing how, despite decreasing hedge fund assets, the hedge fund industry still appeals to risk-taking activist investors looking for undervalued companies); Ken Squire,
A Golden Age for Activist Investing, BARRON’S, Feb. 16, 2009, at 30 (describing the perfect
situation for activist shareholders: enthusiasm for shareholder rights and distressed equity markets); Gregory Zuckerman, Activists Must Adjust Their Aim, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27,
2009, at C10 (noting that while the flow of new activist engagements continues, funds
have lost value in lockstep with market averages, leading to investor withdrawals).
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stock market and ready credit together played an important role in
facilitating the phenomenon.
The activist funds have drawn heavily on the financial agenda in
102
the shareholders’ agency-cost playbook. There are four main means
to the end of agency-cost reduction and value creation: increasing leverage, returning excess cash to shareholders, realizing premiums
through the sale of going-concern assets, and cutting operating costs.
The activists for the most part drew on the first three plays, using their
newly discovered power to prompt borrowing, force the disgorgement
of large cash accounts and the sale of operating divisions, and, in
103
some cases, force the sale of the target company itself. In contrast,
the record on cost-cutting initiatives, which tend to require expertise
104
and knowledge respecting internal operations, is sketchier.
Meanwhile, the activists’ record of success further testifies to the
capital markets’ ability to adapt within the prevailing legal framework.
The strategy, while hostile, only rarely looks to the market for corpo105
rate control. Instead, the players act out a game of threat and resistance, in which victory lies in either the target’s diffusion of the threat
with a governance concession or, in the larger number of cases, with
the insurgent’s entry to the boardroom as a minority blockholder.
Payoff through board membership means taking the benefit of the
richer informational base available inside the company and, in many
106
cases, movement toward a cooperative outcome.
Significantly, the appearance of these new blockholders can be explained by reference to the alignment of incentives bound up in their
shareholding. Hedge funds are independent actors, where other institutional investors are not. They do not sell services to the class of companies they target and so, unlike conventional mutual fund advisors, are
107
unconflicted.
They lock up investor money for longer periods than
do mutual funds and thus have time horizons better suited to gover-

102

See supra text accompanying note 80.
See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375,
1390-1401 (2007) (listing and describing four ways in which an activist investor with
influence can get an immediate return on investment: get the target to sell itself, get
the target to sell a major asset, get the target to pay out spare cash, or have the target
change its long-term business plans).
104
Id. at 1413-15.
105
Id. at 1426-27.
106
Id. at 1428. At the same time, activist hedge funds rely on trading-market liquidity to facilitate exit at a time of their own choosing. Id. at 1412-13.
107
Id. at 1384.
103
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108

nance activism. Finally, the funds in question concentrate on funda109
mental analysis and so pick their targets on a fuller informational basis than customarily is the case with institutional equity investors.
It follows that the barriers to shareholder intervention embedded
in the prevailing legal model are less salient than previously assumed.
The problem lies less with the legal model and more with incentive
constraints bound up in institutional shareholding. The landscape,
however, is dynamic. The hedge funds have inspired interventions by
large, mainstream investment advisors; they also have depended on
and received the support of other, more passive institutional inves110
tors. The emerging picture bespeaks the robustness of a system that
channels shareholder inputs through the board-election franchise.
The point is not that hedge fund activism by itself reduces agency
111
costs to zero.
Indeed, activist shareholder intervention, whether
from a hedge fund blockholder or in the course of a private equity
buyout, confirms the continued presence of the agency costs that
112
The point instead is that,
shareholder proponents seek to control.
given agency costs and the right incentive alignment, the system will
108

Id.
Id. at 1383.
110
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 84, at 14-17 (discussing changes in mutual funds,
such as more activist behavior, which is usually expected from hedge funds, and cooperation with hedge funds designed to pressure a target’s management).
111
Private equity, which carries blockholding to its logical conclusion, presents a
telling comparison case. It has had a mesmerizing effect on some agency theorists,
who have proposed ownership by private equity funds as a strong-form solution to the
problem of separated ownership and control. See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K.
Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital
Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 231-32 (2008) (theorizing that private owners can
transfer risk in discrete slices to parties who can manage or diversify away those risks,
which serves as a lower-cost substitute for traditional risk capital); Michael C. Jensen,
Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1989, at 61 (encouraging
private equity ownership as a solution to “the conflict between owners and managers
over the control and use of corporate resources”).
112
It also should be noted that agency costs at target companies do not by themselves necessarily trigger the requisite financial incentives for outside intervention. Buyouts thrive on cheap, available credit and occur cyclically with its availability. Bratton,
supra note 94, at 521-23. Unsurprisingly, “[p]rivate equity volume plummeted 69 percent
in 2008 because of the lack of credit.” Lindsay Fortado, Linklaters Tops Deal Advisers as
M&A Volume Plummets 38 Percent, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 2, 2009, available at http://www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aNZBdBiog9_0&refer=home. Since then,
many deals have been restructured, with equity swapped for debt. See Jason Kelly & Jonathan Keehner, Private Equity Indigestion Comes with Bain Bloomin’ Onion Debts, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 11, 2009, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601109&sid=apUN4GkGPA.I&refer=home (discussing firms’ employment of tools
such as debt exchanges and equity infusions to restructure and save deals).
109
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address them aggressively, just as Jensen and Meckling predicted.
With managers, the critical incentive change involved incentive compensation. With shareholders, the incentive barrier stemmed from
the shareholders’ own institutional frameworks. Once a framework
conducive to governance intervention finally appeared, the capital
markets provided ready support and the prevailing legal model
proved facilitative.
C. Cash Payouts
Cash disgorgement is a leading shareholder agenda item. According to an account that Michael Jensen articulated in the 1980s, managers habitually hold onto their spare cash, tending to reinvest it in
113
suboptimal projects.
Suboptimal reinvestment, together with conglomerate bust up, was widely held to be the motivation for 1980s takeovers. It remains at the top of the shareholder financial agenda,
even as empirical studies of the problem of suboptimal reinvestment
114
of cash flow have produced mixed results.
Whether or not cash retention remains a serious governance
problem, the cash-disgorgement agenda registered in boardrooms
with unprecedented success during the later stages of the most recent
bull market. Figure 1 below tracks shareholder payouts in the form of
dividends and stock repurchases by the companies in the S&P 500
from 1987 to 2007. The year 1987 is taken as the start date because it
marks the beginning of a three-decade trend of increased resort to
115
open-market repurchases by public companies.
The 1987 year-end
S&P 500 average (247), the companies’ total annual dividend payments in 1987 ($44.3 billion) and their 1987 total repurchases ($32.5
billion) are pegged at 100 on the vertical axis. Figure 1 shows relative

113

Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers,
76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323 (1986).
114
Compare Henri Servaes, Do Takeover Targets Overinvest?, 7 REV. FIN. STUD. 253,
254 (1994) (looking at over 700 takeover targets during the period of 1972 to 1987 and
finding overinvestment only in the larger firms in the sample and in the oil and gas
industry), with Sheridan Titman et al., Capital Investments and Stock Returns 13 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9951, 2003), available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/w9951 (showing a negative connection between high levels of
investment and stock returns).
115
The crash of 1987 amounted to an external shock that moved payout policy in
the direction of repurchases. See William W. Bratton, The New Dividend Puzzle, 93 GEO.
L.J. 845, 871 (2005) (“[The] OMR [(open market repurchase)] advantage was first
discovered in the wake of the stock market crash of 1987. The crash brought an unprecedented increase in OMR programs . . . .”).
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increases and decreases to 2008, when the S&P 500 closed at 366, total
dividends were $247 billion, and total repurchases were $340 billion.
A break in two longstanding trends occurred in 2004. Prior thereto,
increases in levels of dividends and levels of repurchases roughly
tracked increases in stock prices (with both tending to lag behind the
market). There was also a trend of rough parity between total dividends and total repurchases. Both trends ended in 2003 in favor of
an increase in net amounts paid out, with the lion’s share of the increase in the form of repurchases. In 1987, repurchases amounted to
1.6% of average market capitalization, and total payout amounted to
3.8%; in 2007, repurchases amounted to 4.6%, and total payout
amounted to 6.3%. The dollar amount of annual repurchases in116
creased eighteen-fold from 1987 to the peak year of 2007.
Clearly, managers had become more attuned to the shareholder
117
agenda.
Whether hedge fund activism played a role is a matter of
118
speculation, but the suggestion arises.
The suggestion in the end
leads us back to the Jensen and Meckling model. Given excess cash
available for distribution, market-based demands for distribution will
119
follow in the ordinary course. The notable increase in overall levels
paid out suggests an additional point: once the market input registers, many managers can be expected to respond voluntarily.

116

The pattern changed in other respects as well. Prior to 2004, numbers of outstanding shares tended to remain constant even as repurchase activity increased, with
new issues of shares incident to merger activity and employee stock option exercises
matching or exceeding numbers repurchased. From 2004 to 2007, in contrast, 65.1% of
S&P 500 repurchasers reduced numbers of shares outstanding. STANDARD & POOR’S,
S&P 500 BUYBACKS: THREE YEARS AND $1.3 TRILLION LATER 6 (2007), available at http://
www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/121307_SP500_THREE_YEARS_OF_BUY
BACKS.pdf.
117
The financial crisis materially chilled buyback activity in 2008, when “S&P 500
buybacks reached $339.6 billion—a 42.3% drop from the record setting $589.1 billion
spent during 2007.” Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, S&P 500 Stock Buybacks Retreat 66% in Fourth Quarter; Off 42% in 2008 (Mar. 26, 2009), available at http://
www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/032609_Buyback-PR.pdf?vregion=
us&vlang=en.
118
A second factor also should be noted. As between dividends and repurchases,
managers holding unexercised stock options have a financial incentive to make repurchases. Bratton, supra note 115, at 872-76.
119
Even as the pattern began to change in 2004 and 2005, Wall Street analysts
were complaining that corporations were husbanding cash at historically high levels.
See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 103, at 1394 (noting that in 2006 “the S&P 500’s cash accounts stood at the highest point since the early 1980s” and that shareholders maintained the position that free cash flow should be paid out).
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Figure 1: Payouts, 1987–2008
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D. Summary
This Section’s title, “Systemic Responsiveness,” summarizes our
reading of institutional changes within corporate governance. It is an
agency-cost story that starts out at the same place and time as the
shareholder story—namely, with the external shocks of the 1980s.
The shocks—deregulation, globalization, and new technology—were
exogenous to the corporate governance system but stemmed from
endogenous adjustments elsewhere in the economy. The shareholder
story freezes the frame at the end of the 1980s conflicts, making its
case for law reform by depicting the governance system as static and
unresponsive. We move the frame forward in time to show that the
corporate governance system made a series of endogenous adjustments addressed to agency-cost control both in the boardroom and in
the financial markets. Significantly, none of the changes described
required resort to new regulation.
The prevailing legal model emerges as a constant factor in this
picture of dynamic change. The constancy follows from the legal
model’s capaciousness. It sets out a minimal list of mandates—
management by the board, annual election by the shareholders, and
the managers’ duty of loyalty. Within this framework, parties may
conduct governance as they deem appropriate. Thus the model can
accommodate management domination and shareholder passivity on
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the one hand and shareholder activism and management disempowerment on the other. Particular results follow from incentives, which
in turn originate in contracts between the corporation and its managers and contracts between investing entities and their investors.
Our argument puts agency costs, as discussed in policy contexts,
back in touch with their theoretical roots. Jensen and Meckling predicted not only dynamic adaptation toward the end of removing money from the table but an agency-cost residuum too costly for removal
through private ordering. An important point follows: persistent residual agency costs do not by themselves justify regulatory intervention. The cost-benefit case for reducing residual agency costs by regulation must be made independently, and it may lead to the conclusion
that the participants are better off bearing the residual costs. The
shareholders emphasize benefits only, ignoring the costs implied by
their suggested reforms. Part III confronts these costs.
We close this Part with three caveats respecting normative implications. First, this is a positive account, put forward to import balance to
the factual background in which shareholder reform proposals are
evaluated and to denude it of any suggestion of economic urgency.
Second, the endogenous changes we describe have contractual origins
and so benefit from a normative presumption in their favor. But
normative questions are by no means foreclosed. We will ask a few of
our own, respecting equity incentive pay, in Parts III and IV. Third,
our picture of systemic responsiveness would, if extended to the extreme, imply that law is irrelevant. We would not make this extension.
To the contrary, we think that law matters here because it accords the
board of directors a zone of discretion in which to make informed
business decisions disfavored by the market, a view presented more
fully in Part III.
III. SHAREHOLDER EMPOWERMENT AND ECONOMIC THEORY
Everybody agrees that managers know more than shareholders.
Everybody also agrees that agency costs arise when managers use this
informational advantage for their own gain. The result is one of the
paradigmatic problems that corporate law tries to solve. Shareholder
advocates would address the problem by giving the shareholders sufficient power to impress their preferences, as expressed in market price
signals, upon the managers. This gives rise to two key questions: what
do the shareholders whose trades shape market prices actually know,
and what does the market price teach the wider group of shareholders? Shareholder empowerment assumes that the price setters know
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quite a bit and that the wider group learns a lot from the price the former set, including not only the true value of the corporation but answers to specific questions such as whether or not managers are doing a
good enough job to deserve the compensation proposed by the board
of directors. In this Part, we appraise these assumptions, addressing the
question of what shareholders actually know and taking into account
not only the traditional literature on information asymmetries but also
the emerging literature on heterogeneous expectations.
We begin on the positive side of the street, stating the best case for
shareholder empowerment. This conjoins the semi-strong form of the
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH) and the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM) to depict a world in which market prices, although reflecting only information from past market prices and current publicly available information, accurately reflect expectations
respecting future fundamental value. We show that the market price,
thus modeled, can indeed signal a need to reduce agency costs. But
we also highlight a problem of diminishing returns. The market price
sends reliable governance signals only in a subset of cases characterized by clear-cut issues and minimal information asymmetries. As governance issues become more complex and information asymmetries
more pervasive, market signals become difficult to read.
We then cross to the negative side of the street to confront a critical question: if management’s informational superiority presents a
paradigmatic problem, how does the stock price surmount the information asymmetry barrier? The answer is that it does not. Strongform efficiency, under which the stock price impounds all private as
well as public information, does not hold; hence, managers know
more than they disclose and the stock price does not impound the
undisclosed information. Traditional ECMH makes a relatively modest claim respecting the informativeness of the market price. Its implications for corporate governance are therefore modest.
Finally, we tread deeper into negative territory to ask what happens when managers shape business policy to cater to uninformed
market prices. This inquiry upsets the neatness of even the limited
claims that market efficiency holds for corporate governance. New
corporate finance models based on heterogeneous expectations make
particularly stark projections of suboptimal results. The heterogeneity
models show that the information conveyed by the price sometimes
can be misleading for purposes of business policymaking. These periods, although limited, are important.
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We go on to explore these models’ implications for corporate governance, reaching two critical conclusions: First, shareholder empowerment will make it much more difficult for a good board of directors
to resist pressures to manage to the market. This can lead to bad business decisions, either due to information asymmetry or a run of speculative mispricing. Second, incentive-compatible executive compensation
and shareholder empowerment are inconsistent goals. If executive
compensation can be fixed by requiring longer holding periods, it is
then turned around and unfixed if managers are encouraged to manage the market as a response to shareholder empowerment.
We note a methodological constraint. We confine our economic
evaluation to the rational-expectations framework held out by traditional financial economics. We think this “high church” literature
more than suffices to undercut the case for shareholder empowerment. At the same time, we acknowledge a significant body of beha120
We
vioral work on market pricing, both theoretical and empirical.
omit reference to it for simplicity, toward the end of avoiding an unnecessary excursion onto disputed methodological territory.
Section A shows what market pricing efficiency can and cannot do
for the shareholder case. Section B, describing the pricing salience of
120

These studies focus on sentiment, investment styles, and asset tastes. For a review of the behavioral finance literature, including studies in trading activity, research
in corporate finance, and analyses of stock returns, see Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Behavioural Finance: A Review and Synthesis, 14 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 12 (2007). Traditional
pricing theory holds that the prices of two assets move together as a result of comovement in fundamental value. But, given market frictions, limits to arbitrage, and irrational (or “sentimental”) investors, comovement might have other causes. Coordinated demand, then, influences prices. See Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, Investor
Sentiment and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns, 61 J. FIN. 1645, 1648-50 (2006) (examining sentiment’s impact on the cross section of stock returns from 1963 to 2001 and
showing that high-sentiment investors gravitate to young, small, unprofitable growth
stocks or distressed issues, while low-sentiment investors like large, profitable dividend
payers, and that abrupt changes in sentiment result in demand shocks for sensitive
stocks); Nicholas Barberis et al., Comovement, 75 J. FIN. ECON. 283, 284 (2005) (showing
that investors group assets into categories); Nicholas Barberis & Andrei Shleifer, Style
Investing, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 161, 162-64 (2003) (examining the impact of style investing
on institutional and individual investors); Paul A. Gompers & Andrew Metrick, Institutional Investors and Equity Prices, 116 Q.J. ECON. 229, 230-36, 244 (2001) (showing that
institutions like large, liquid stocks with relatively low returns in the year prior to purchase, and that institutional demand for large issues accounted for nearly fifty percent
of the issues’ relative price appreciation of large over small stocks across the period
1980 to 1996); Alok Kumar & Charles M.C. Lee, Retail Investor Sentiment and Return
Comovements, 61 J. FIN. 2451, 2453-54 (2006) (showing that retail investors tend to nest
in small firms, lower-price firms, firms with relatively low levels of institutional ownership, and value firms).
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information asymmetries, shows that the best case is incomplete. Section C details the impact of heterogeneous investor expectations and
the value-destructive effects of managing to a speculative market.
A. Pricing Efficiency and the Case for Shareholder Empowerment
If financial markets were strong-form efficient, stock prices would
fully and correctly reflect all relevant information, both public and
private. In such a state of the world, the shareholder proponents’ case
would be compelling, and the paradigmatic problem of corporate law
would vanish. Shareholders could know as much as the managers if
they carefully scrutinized the stock price and attended to public disclosures and leaks of material nonpublic information. Powerful implications for corporate governance would obtain.
If shareholders were thus informed, directors might understandably view themselves more as agents of the shareholders and less as
their trustees. As faithful agents, the directors would seek to learn
their principals’ wishes. The financial market would hold out the best
source of this information, since the movement of stock prices would
reveal the shareholders’ well-informed preferences respecting corporate developments. Managers might even vet investment decisions
with the market and observe the pricing effect, adopting strategies
leading to stock price increases and abandoning those leading to
stock price declines.
But this is not the state of the world according to the modern corporate finance literature, a literature with complex and easily misunderstood implications for corporate governance. We explore these
below and contend that one thing is clear: shareholder proponents
wrongly assume that agency costs can be reduced without countervailing negative effects when directors act more like agents and manage
to shareholder preferences signaled in market prices.
1. ECMH, CAPM, and the Value of a Share
Markets would be strong-form efficient if they priced in all information—material nonpublic information as well as all public information. It is, however, generally accepted that financial markets are not
121
strong-form efficient. In contrast, ECMH’s semi-strong form is gener-

121

See, e.g., STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 359 (6th ed. 2002)
(“Even the strongest adherents to the efficient-market hypothesis would not be surprised to find that markets are inefficient in the strong form.”).
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ally accepted. This, sometimes called “informational efficiency,” posits
that the capital markets embed all publicly available information into
122
security prices. It has two implications: first, that no trading strategy
123
based on public information can regularly outperform the market,
and, second, that insiders who possess nonpublic information can out124
perform the market when trading in their own stock. The latter point
is hardly surprising since it means that insiders, even after making all
required disclosures, remain better informed than outsiders. Add this
up and an important point emerges for our argument: informational
asymmetries exist in tandem with “informational efficiency,” with the
managers and directors having the informational advantage.
Now for a second key point: the informational efficiency posited
by ECMH does not imply that the share price equals the pro rata value
125
of the discounted free cash flows of the corporation. This is a point
that is often misunderstood. To say that no investment strategy can
outperform the market does not in itself say anything about the stock
price’s accuracy in measuring the corporation’s fundamental value—
that is, the discounted value of expected future free cash flows. ECMH

122

See Burton G. Malkiel, Efficient Market Hypothesis, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICMONEY AND FINANCE 739, 739 (Peter Newman et al. eds., 1992). ECMH
asserts that the stock market possesses efficiency attributes in terms of three alternative, progressively more inclusive information sets. See, e.g., id. at 739-41. The first, or
weak form, defines market efficiency in terms of past market prices. The market is efficient according to the weak form if investors cannot predict future stock price
movements based on an information set containing all past price movements. As
noted in the text, the second, or semi-strong form, defines market efficiency in terms
of all publicly available information. The third, or strong form, includes nonpublic
information as part of the information set. Markets are efficient according to the
strong form if stock prices include all nonpublic information as well as public information. Consequently, if the strong form were to hold, an investor who was privy to both
private and nonprivate information could not consistently earn abnormally large investment returns.
123
See id. at 739 (asserting that under the “semi-strong form of EMH . . . an analysis of balance sheets, income statements, announcements of dividend changes or stock
splits or any other public information about a company . . . will not yield abnormal
economic profits”).
124
See Lisa K. Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, 47 J. FIN.
1661, 1696 (1992) (“The analysis suggests that insider trading increases stock price accuracy by moving stock prices significantly.”); see also Dirk Jenter, Market Timing and
Management Portfolio Decisions, 60 J. FIN. 1903, 1906 (2005) (showing that managers
trade as contrarians and earn excess returns on their trades, but that the excess returns
disappear after controlling for size and book-to-market effects).
125
See JOHN Y. CAMPBELL ET AL., THE ECONOMETRICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 24-25
(1997) (discussing reasons why “perfect [stock] efficiency is an unrealistic benchmark
that is unlikely to hold in practice”).
TIONARY OF
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only requires that stock price movements mirror a random walk, and,
as long as stock price movements are random, outguessing the market
is not possible. Whether the random walk moves around, away from,
or ultimately always stumbles into the correct price is another matter.
To evaluate this possibility, we must look to CAPM.
The corporation is a collection of assets and its value is the free
cash flow that those assets are expected to generate into the indefinite
future. CAPM provides the discount rate needed to state those ex127
pected future free cash flows as a present value.
The discount rate
reflects the riskiness of the expected flows—the more risky the flows,
the higher the discount rate and the lower the present value. CAPM is
a theory of risk that boils down to the assertion that a given corporation’s discount rate will be proportional to its expected future free
cash flows’ covariance with the economy’s free cash flows.
With these building blocks, we can further investigate the question whether efficient stock prices provide an accurate measure of the
fundamental value of the corporation—that is, the discounted value
of the firm’s expected future free cash flows. All turns on the word
“expected” in the concept of “expected free cash flows.” Since future
results are unknowable, fundamental value turns on expected rather
than actual cash flows. Nothing in the theory even remotely suggests
that these future expectations will be borne out by the passage of
time. Expectations can turn out to be wildly incorrect.
Despite this, the statement that “stock market prices are always
correct” remains close to being definitionally true. The syllogism is
the following: first, financial markets do capture future expectations
more reliably than any other mechanism; second, fundamental value
turns on expectations of the future free cash flows. Since the market
provides the most reliable estimate of future expectations, it is reasonable to define value in terms of market price.
The market-based definition of value is particularly appealing for
corporate law because it follows from the valuations of willing buyers
and sellers. A key assumption in this line of reasoning, homogeneity
126

RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 333-41 (8th ed.

2006).
127

See John Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments
in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REV. ECON. & STAT. 13, 27 (1965) (“The analysis thus justifies viewing market values as riskless-rate present values of certaintyequivalents of random future receipts . . . .” (italics omitted)); William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425, 43642 (1964) (describing the “consistent relationship between . . . expected returns and
what might best be called systematic risk”).
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128

of expectations, further enhances its appeal. CAPM assumes that all
individuals have access to all of the publicly available information and
reach the same expectations about the future. As a result, CAPM assumes that all investors employ the same valuation metrics and share
prevailing market expectations. Shareholders, market price setters, and
passive proxy voters alike become one. Under this model of value, the
shareholders expeditiously can deliver governance instructions through
the market price. To see how, imagine that a shareholders’ meeting
was convened to set a value on the company. Under this unitary model
of the shareholder, the resulting value would be the market price; it follows that the meeting need not be called in the first place. More generally, under an agency model of the corporation, the manager-agents
should look to the market price for the principal’s instructions.
Of course, expectations do differ among investors in the real
world. One still might believe that the market price reflects the average shareholder’s expectations and so provides a reliable proxy for
fundamental value. As we shall see below, however, switching to an
assumption of heterogeneous expectations generates results that lead
to profoundly different implications for corporate law.
2. Implications for the Case for Shareholder Empowerment
Shareholder proponents take the market price, as modeled in traditional financial economics, as the best available projection of a corporation’s expected future cash flows. They then hold it out as an essential
point of reference in the detection and reduction of management agency costs. They do not deny the existence of information asymmetries
but, at least implicitly, assume them to have been minimized by increases
129
in market efficiency and a thick layer of disclosure requirements.
A hostile tender offer for a publicly traded company presents the
best case for this approach. Hypothesize an offer at a substantial premium over the market price and incumbent managers who contend that
their business plan holds out superior prospects for long-term value enhancement. How should the target’s directors respond? With minimal
information asymmetries, the answer is clear: the directors should ac-

128

See Sharpe, supra note 127, at 433-34 (assuming “homogeneity of investor expectations” as a condition for equilibrium in capital markets).
129
See Gordon, supra note 51, at 1548-63 (describing the increase in the content
and scope of mandated disclosures over the last fifty years and suggesting a causal role
in the rise of the independent board).
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cept the voice of the shareholders as expressed through the market
price, which elevates the bid price over the incumbents’ business plan.
The case is easy because information asymmetries do not complicate
it. In the shareholder proponents’ view, when management holds out its
business plan as superior in the teeth of the market’s rejection, it inappropriately uses its position of informational superiority as an excuse for
what amounts to self-interested entrenchment. In the informationally
rich environment of the takeover market, it can be argued that informational asymmetries are at their lowest level. Given this, the shareholders
know the value of the corporation substantially as well as the managers
do. It follows that the market price is the only metric needed to decide
the appropriate outcome and that the legal rule should allow shareholders to decide the contest for control at the tendering stage.
Now consider a more difficult case, which concerns the selection
of the terms of an executive compensation scheme. In theory, a given
scheme should be geared to the recent performance of the individual
executives. This recent data, however, will not be fully available to the
public. Even given the full set of data, choices remain respecting the
terms of the performance-based compensation scheme. The actor designing the package must exercise judgment, for, in practice, there is
no generally accepted template that sets out the terms of an optimal
130
Now imagine a package assembled and submitted to the
package.
shareholders pursuant to a “say on pay” mandate. How will the shareholders evaluate the plan? Given all of the above, the vote likely will
reflect levels of satisfaction with recent price performance rather than
considered views about optimal incentive pay or the full set of performance data, much of which will remain unobservable.
More generally, as information asymmetries become greater in
scope, which occurs as business-policy choices become more complex,
the stock price becomes less an objective report on a particular value
outcome and more an input for interpretation. Policymaking becomes an exercise calling for inside information, experience, and
sound business judgment. The tie between inputs garnered from
shareholder votes, which in turn reflect overall levels of satisfaction
with price performance, and the reduction of particular agency costs
becomes much attenuated.

130

For a presentation of the range of positions taken in the literature, see William
W. Bratton, The Academic Tournament over Executive Compensation, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1557,
1562-75 (2005) (reviewing LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004)).
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Shareholder proponents do not deny this even as they seek to
open doors to shareholder intervention. They avoid the trap of recommending that uninformed shareholders routinely make business
131
decisions by focusing on deterrent effects. Shareholder intervention
emerges as a potential threat that managers will avoid by managing to
the market. The proponents’ case accordingly turns on an implicit
assertion: information asymmetries are small relative to the agency
costs at stake, so that managing to the market either brings positive
results or does no harm.
We disagree with the assertion. The importance of information
asymmetries relative to agency costs is an empirical question to which
no one has an answer. The best that can be said for the shareholders is
that their agenda’s credibility improves to the extent that information
asymmetries are minimal. But minimal information deficits cannot
safely be assumed. Section III.B, which follows, shows that information
asymmetries are real. Section III.B goes on to address the claim that
managing to the market can do no harm, showing that managing to an
uninformed market price can result in suboptimal business policy.
That problem reemerges in more acute form in Section III.C, which
discusses speculative overpricing under heterogeneous expectations.
B. The Information Asymmetry Problem
We have seen that strong-form efficiency would support a nearly
unassailable case for shareholder empowerment. But financial markets
are not strong-form efficient. Information asymmetries are real. Empirical studies confirm this point beyond doubt, showing that managers
132
who trade in their corporation’s shares earn abnormally high returns.
Information asymmetries make it difficult for the market to
project accurately the free cash flows that the corporation will produce. The difficulties extend to ascertainment of a capitalization
133
rate, as well as to the projection of future free cash flows. This Sec131

See supra text accompanying note 76.
See Malcolm Baker et al., Behavioral Corporate Finance (asserting that “corporate
managers have superior information about their own firm,” which “is underscored by
the evidence that managers earn abnormally high returns on their own trades”), in 1
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 145, 149 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2007).
133
It bears noting that the informational imbalance impacts both sides of the valuation exercise—the ascertainment of the discount rate as well as the projection of future free cash flows. See Wachter, supra note 44, at 792-93 (discussing the inability of
existing models to accurately estimate the discount or market capitalization rates).
CAPM provides the most common approach for accessing the risk premium in the dis132
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tion explores the implications of these difficulties for corporate governance. It makes two points. First, information asymmetries are not
going to go away. Second, the evidence confirms their status as a salient factor in business policymaking. Systemic change that forced
management to the market price would enhance their salience, increasing agency costs. An uninformed market is structurally incapable
of sending business policymakers a determinative signal. It follows
that, given asymmetric information, market signals need to be interpreted on a continuous basis rather than followed blindly. The job of
interpretation is an intrinsic management function.
1. Persistence
If information asymmetries would just go away, the case for shareholder empowerment would be straightforward. Yet shareholder proponents do not seek a level informational playing field. There is no
call for full disclosure in the form of a requirement that corporations
134
disclose all relevant information, a requirement presently absent
from both the federal securities laws and state corporate law.
Nor should there be. Corporate finance theory holds that full dis135
closure by the firm is prohibitively costly. Full (or fuller) disclosure
carries costs of reduced incentives, increased regulation, and the proprietary cost that follows from sharing private information with competing firms. It also holds out benefits. Better quality disclosure can
reduce the firm’s equity cost of capital and enhance the liquidity of its
publicly traded securities. In equilibrium, the level of disclosure follows from a trade-off of these costs and benefits, with different firms
136
gravitating to different disclosure levels. Several mechanisms reduce
count rate. More specifically, it employs an empirically derived single risk factor, beta
(β), that measures a given stock’s contribution to the systematic risk in the market
portfolio. Although betas customarily are estimated from market data, the true underlying beta depends on the covariance of the firm’s free cash flows with the overall market’s free cash flows, factors that may be better known by the managers than the market.
134
We have seen that this is Fama and Jensen’s basic point. See supra text accompanying note 31.
135
See S.J. Grossman & O.D. Hart, Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids, 35 J. FIN. 323,
323-24 (1980) (illustrating formally that full disclosure presupposes three conditions:
(1) that investors know that firms possess the information; (2) that affirmative misrepresentation does not occur; and (3) that disclosure is costless).
136
See John E. Core, A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature: Discussion, 31 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 441, 442-44 (2001) (“This choice involves trading off the reduction in
the information asymmetry component of the cost of capital that results from increased disclosure quality against the costs of reduced incentives, litigation costs, and
proprietary costs.” (citations omitted)).
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the asymmetry without eliminating it—the mandatory disclosure system, the work of financial analysts, and the investigations of large, ac137
tivist shareholders. The magnitude of the resulting imbalance varies
from firm to firm, becoming more severe as the duration of the firm’s
investments increases, the firm’s business plan focuses on growth, and
138
the firm’s size is smaller.
2. Evidence and Effects
Information asymmetries figure prominently in leading economic
139
accounts of corporate financial practices.
Simply, managers take
137

See Jeremy C. Stein, Agency, Information and Corporate Investment (noting that
even as governance processes, capital structure, incentive contracts, intermediation,
and the mandatory disclosure regime reduce informational distortions, some remain
unresolved and relevant in equilibrium), in 1A HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF
FINANCE 111, 115 (George M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2003).
138
For example, a long-established business with no growth opportunities confronts a relatively small information asymmetry problem. It, accordingly, will have little
incentive to go beyond mandated disclosure items. In contrast, a firm with abundant
growth opportunities and a more complicated information set has a more serious information asymmetry problem. Depending on the interplay of costs and benefits, its
managers may find it advantageous to make additional voluntary disclosures. See Core,
supra note 136, at 443 (examining which firms will find it optimal to make voluntary
disclosures); see also Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Information Asymmetry, Corporate
Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature, 31 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 405, 420-25 (2001) (examining the motives behind voluntary disclosure). Investor relations also influence these choices—firms with large analyst followings and large populations of institutional investors tend to disclose more. See Healy &
Palepu, supra, at 416-18 (suggesting that management might voluntarily disclose where
analysts give favorable ratings); Paul M. Healy et al., Stock Performance and Intermediation
Changes Surrounding Sustained Increases in Disclosure, 16 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 485, 48990 (1999) (noting that a multivariate analysis demonstrated that “increased disclosure
is related to . . . growth in institutional ownership and analyst coverage”). Finally, as
the shareholder proponents assert, agency costs also play into the mix. Managers have
incentives to make self-serving disclosures. See Healy & Palepu, supra, at 421, 425 (explaining that managers have incentives to make capital-cost-lowering disclosures). Ultimately, the credibility of any firm’s disclosures (and hence the firm’s proximity to the
optimal level and quality of disclosure) depends on the effectiveness of its governance.
See Core, supra note 136, at 444 (“[I]t is the governance structure that constrains the
manager to follow optimal policy.”). Empirical literature supports all of the foregoing
points. See Christian Leuz & Peter Wysocki, Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting and Disclosure Regulation: A Review and Suggestions for Future Research 23-38
(Mar. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105398.
139
See, e.g., Hayne E. Leland & David H. Pyle, Informational Asymmetries, Financial
Structure, and Financial Intermediation, 32 J. FIN. 371, 372 (1977) (noting that while an
entrepreneur may not be able to directly convey inside information, she may be able to
signal that information to potential shareholders based on the fraction of equity that
she retains); Merton H. Miller & Kevin Rock, Dividend Policy Under Asymmetric Information, 40 J. FIN. 1031, 1031 (1985) (arguing that “managers know more than outside in-

BRATTONWACHTER_FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment

2/16/2010 1:04 PM

699

advantage of market overvaluation to tap the equity markets. The pattern shows up both with initial public offerings (IPOs) and equity offerings by seasoned issuers. For example, studies show that IPOs are
positively correlated with ex ante indicators of overpricing, such as the
140
industry’s market-to-book ratios and stock indexes. Seasoned issuers
keep an eye out for market windows: a survey of corporate CFOs
shows that two-thirds look for market overvaluation before issuing eq141
Studies also show that IPO issuers underperform relative to
uity.
142
comparables for years after the offering, with the underperformance
serving as ex post confirmation of overpricing at the time of the offering. The same result occurs in the years after seasoned issuers sell
more stock—the range of underperformance relative to the market is
143
twenty to forty percent during the subsequent five years. Unsurprisingly, the asymmetrically informed markets react negatively to the
vestors about the true state of the firm’s current earnings”); Stephen A. Ross, The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach, 8 BELL J. ECON. 23,
27-31 (1977) (developing a model that establishes a signaling equilibrium based on the
assumption that managers have inside information).
140
See Baker et al., supra note 132, at 159-60 (surveying literature that suggests equity issuance is correlated with overvaluation); Joshua Lerner, Venture Capitalists and the
Decision to Go Public, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 293-94, 299 (1994) (finding, in a comparison
of the number of IPOs and a biotechnology equity index, that venture capitalists time
IPOs and that “IPOs coincide with the peaks in equity valuations”); Tim Loughran et
al., Initial Public Offerings: International Insights, 2 PAC.-BASIN FIN. J. 165, 166 (1994)
(finding that, in fourteen of the fifteen countries examined, “IPO volume is positively
correlated with the inflation-adjusted level of the stock market”); Marco Pagano et al.,
Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis, 53 J. FIN. 27, 28 (1998) (finding that
“the main factor affecting the probability of an IPO is the market-to-book ratio at
which firms in the same industry trade”).
141
See Baker et al., supra note 132, at 159 (“Several lines of evidence suggest that
overvaluation is a motive for equity issuance. . . . [Two-thirds] of CFOs of public corporations . . . state that ‘the amount by which our stock is undervalued or overvalued was
an important or very important consideration’ in issuing equity.” (citations omitted)).
142
See Jay R. Ritter, The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings, 46 J. FIN. 3, 3
(1991) (contending that “in the long-run, initial public offerings appear to be overpriced,” and finding that “in the 3 years after going public these firms significantly underperformed a set of comparable firms matched by size and industry”). Several empirical studies have also found that for IPOs declining profitability and investment
after the IPOs suggest that the issuances were incidences of market timing. See Pagano
et al., supra note 140, at 28-29 (“Our finding that investment and profitability decrease
after the IPO points to the [attempt-to-time-the-market] explanation.”).
143
See Baker et al., supra note 132, at 160 (“[O]n average, US equity issues underperform the market somewhere in the ballpark of 20-40% over five years.”); see also
Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, The Equity Share in New Issues and Aggregate Stock Returns, 55 J. FIN. 2219, 2219 (2000) (“When equity prices are too high, existing shareholders benefit by issuing overvalued equity. When equity prices are too low, issuing
debt is preferable. Consistent with this timing hypothesis, firms issuing equity have
poor subsequent performance.”).
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very announcement of a new stock offering. This limits the availability
of equity as a financing alternative, particularly when the managers
144
deem their stock to be underpriced or correctly priced.
Perceived undervaluation also drives financing choices, but in the
opposite direction. These companies finance with debt rather than
145
equity.
And, instead of selling more stock, they repurchase stock
previously issued. Subsequent returns on repurchased stock are positive, running twelve percent above those on comparables over four
146
Significantly, although the announcement of a repurchase
years.
program means a small bump for the stock price, the pattern of positive subsequent returns shows that the market does not fully assimilate
147
the signal’s informational content.
Information asymmetries also lead to complications for corporate
investment policy. The complications arise when managers manage to
the market, factoring expected stock price reactions into their decisions. To see the complications, hypothesize a company with a new,
long-term investment project. The new project is complicated and so
presents the market with a costly and lengthy exercise in valuation. As
148
a result, the new project is likely to be mispriced by the market. Giv144

Managers who believe their stock to be correctly priced or underpriced will
avoid selling new equity, financing with debt or internal cash flow. See Stein, supra note
137, at 118-19 (examining models of debt financing or cash-flow financing). Managers
of firms with good potential investments but constraints on these sources of financing
must sell new equity or forego the investments. They are forced to time their financing, and hence their investment, to the underinformed market price, with a sacrifice of
flexibility. See Malcolm Baker et al., When Does the Market Matter? Stock Prices and the Investment of Equity-Dependent Firms, 118 Q.J. ECON. 969, 986-90 (2003) (showing that investment by firms with financing constraints is sensitive to the market price).
145
See Armen Hovakimian et al., The Debt-Equity Choice, 36 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 1, 3-4 (2001) (determining that “firms with higher current stock prices (relative to their past stock prices, book values, or earnings) are more likely to issue equity
rather than debt and repurchase debt rather than equity” and that this finding is “consistent with agency and information asymmetry models where managers are either reluctant to issue equity at low prices or have an incentive to boost their leverage when
the stock prices are low”); Paul Marsh, The Choice Between Equity and Debt: An Empirical
Study, 37 J. FIN. 121, 133 (1982) (finding that the total amount of U.K. companies’ equity and debt issues is related to the performance of the stock and bond markets).
146
See David Ikenberry et al., Market Underreaction to Open Market Share Repurchases,
39 J. FIN. ECON. 181, 184 (1995) (“Beginning in the month following the repurchase
announcement, the average buy-and-hold return over the next four years is more than
12% above that of a control portfolio.”).
147
See id. at 184 (“The most striking finding . . . is that the information conveyed
by open market share repurchases is largely ignored.”).
148
See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors
and Firms, 80 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 148, 148 (1990) (“The time to disappearance of mispricing depends on how fast . . . investor misperceptions are cor-
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en managers who cater to the stock price, the risk of underpricing may
149
lead management to pass up the opportunity. The greater the stress
on keeping up the stock price, the more likely this suboptimal result.
Given an uninformed market and managers inclined to cater to
the price, investment decisions may be keyed to what the market expects—its schematized picture of the company and its strategy and
prospects. When a manager sees an opportunity not yet in the market’s
picture of the company and predicts that the market will react negatively to a shift in emphasis, she must undertake a process of informational
150
mediation. The result is costly delay. Contrariwise, if the market exrected . . . .”). There are numerous articles providing empirical confirmation of this mispricing. See, e.g., Craig W. Holden & Leonard L. Lundstrum, Costly Trading, Managerial
Myopia and Long-Term Investment 3-4 (Sept. 16, 2005) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=809507 (showing that firms selected for long-term
traded options (and hence a lower cost of trading on long-term information) increased
their research and development (R&D) to sales ratios twenty-three percent to twentyeight percent compared to matching firms not selected for long-term traded options in
the two years following selection); see also Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial
Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61, 63-67 (1988) (showing formally that, even absent agency
costs, managers of a firm threatened by a takeover will sell an underpriced asset).
We note that direct empirical testing of these assertions is difficult. This follows from
the nature of the phenomenon predicted—underinvestment tends to be unobservable
by the market. See Stein, supra note 137, at 131 (noting that models of investment can be
difficult to test because underinvestment occurs in “activities that are not directly observable by the market” (emphasis omitted)). Market-timing studies showing that firms issuing equity have strong operating numbers two years prior to the issuance and weak
numbers thereafter provide indirect evidence, with underinvestment prior to the offering as a possible cause of the earnings pattern. See id. at 132 (examining studies where
circumstantial evidence of underinvestment results from such an earnings pattern).
149
See Richard E. Kihlstrom & Michael L. Wachter, Corporate Policy and the Coherence
of Delaware Takeover Law, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 523, 551-56 (2003) (showing formally that
managers vulnerable to a hostile offer and having better information about prospective investments will forego unpopular investment opportunities and fail to maximize
the value of the corporation); Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms:
A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q.J. ECON. 655, 667 (1989) (modeling suboptimal investment where managers maximize a weighted average of near-term stock
prices and long-run value); see also Miller & Rock, supra note 139, at 1031-33 (presenting a model of shareholder investment and management decisionmaking where
asymmetric information leads to suboptimal levels of investment); M.P. Narayanan,
Managerial Incentives for Short-Term Results, 40 J. FIN. 1469, 1469-70 (1985) (showing that
reputational incentives can lead to underinvestment).
150
See Philippe Aghion & Jeremy C. Stein, Growth Versus Margins: Destabilizing Consequences of Giving the Stock Market What It Wants, 63 J. FIN. 1025, 1025 (2008) (creating a
model in which managers can devote resources to either increasing sales growth or
improving per-unit profit margins and arguing that devoting resources to one end
necessarily means sacrificing the other). As modeled, the market puts more weight on
growth metrics when it sees a growth firm and more weight on cost-cutting metrics
when it sees a business plan focused on profit margins. Id. at 1032-35. Problems arise
for a manager who decides, as events unfold in the product market, to move from a
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pects a company to invest in a line of business that the market believes
will be highly profitable in the future, the managers will feel pressured
to make the market-favored investment even if they understand that it is
151
suboptimal based on their superior, contrarian information.
Excessive concern about stock price effects also leads to earnings
management, which can in turn lead to underinvestment. In a world
where institutional fund managers benchmark portfolios by reference
152
to quarterly earnings per share (EPS), sensitivity to stock market
153
reactions implies a focus on quarterly earnings numbers.
Once
management prioritizes meeting the market’s EPS expectations, investments that enhance long-term value but impair near-term earn154
ings may be delayed or foregone. Unsurprisingly, the more sensitive
growth posture to present-profit maximization. The manager devises strategies in a
two-way feedback process with the market and so delays shifting resources from growth
to cost cutting until such time as the market can appreciate the business wisdom of the
shift. Id. at 1027, 1042-43. The delay is suboptimal, and the later change of direction
is abrupt. The more the manager cares about the stock price, the more dramatic the
oscillation. Id. at 1035.
151
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Lars A. Stole, Do Short-Term Objectives Lead to Underor Overinvestment in Long-Term Projects?, 48 J. FIN. 719, 720 (1993) (demonstrating that,
where information about long-term investment is available to investors, overinvestment
may result because long-term investment may be seen as a signal of a positive long-term
outlook). Carrying this out a step, similarly situated managers with reputational concerns may “herd” into a subset of favored but suboptimal investments. See Stein, supra
note 137, at 132-33; see also Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of
Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 672 (2006) (describing the connection between
overvalued stock and value-destroying decisionmaking).
152
See Alfred Rappaport, The Economics of Short-Term Price Obsession, FIN. ANALYSTS
J., May–June 2005, at 65, 65 (discussing investors’ and managers’ “mutually reinforcing
obsession with short-term performance”). In addition, those who actively manage
their portfolios tend to hold stocks for short periods. Id. at 66-68.
153
Managers have been shown to be more sensitive to accounting earnings than to
cash flows. See John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 6 (2005) (“[A]ccounting earnings matter more to managers than cash flows for financial reporting purposes . . . .”).
154
Investment activity can negatively impact near-term earnings because the
amount funded must be expensed, as is the case with R&D costs. Prioritizing earnings
can also mean delaying other expenses, such as maintenance or advertising, even
though management believes that present action enhances long-term firm value. Alternatively, managers making a capital investment decision can face a choice between
one project with higher later cash flows and higher present value (but lower near-term
earnings) and a project with higher earlier cash flows and lower present value (but
higher near-term earnings). For one study which examines such choices, see Sanjeev
Bhojraj & Robert Libby, Capital Market Pressure, Disclosure Frequency-Induced Earnings/Cash
Flow Conflict, and Managerial Myopia, 80 ACCT. REV. 1, 2 (2005). Maximizing long-term
value signals the first investment, while maximizing near-term EPS signals the second.
Numerous scholars have tested this empirically. See Brian J. Bushee, The Influence
of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior, 73 ACCT. REV. 305, 306-07,
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a given CEO’s pay is to the stock price, the higher the level of earn155
ings management at the firm.
In summary, maximizing the corporation’s fundamental value and
maximizing its stock price can amount to distinct objectives in the presence of information asymmetries. Directors can attach a value to the
corporation that is not only different from that reflected in the market
price but better informed. When directors opt to maximize the stock’s
present appeal they may in the end sacrifice long-term shareholder value. Consequently, managing to an underinformed market price holds
out intrinsic risks for business policy, particularly investment policy.
3. Idiosyncratic Volatility
We note that a recent line of empirical studies is thought to cut
against the foregoing results. These studies assert that the shareholders’ information asymmetry problem diminished substantially as the
securities markets developed and deepened over the last half century.
They track the quantum of stock price variation explained by movements across the market as a whole, showing a substantial diminution
over time, along with a concomitant increase in firm-specific, or “idio319-30 (1998) (showing that a responsive reduction of R&D spending is likely in firms
with low institutional holdings, but that in firms whose predominant owners are institutions with high portfolio turnover and momentum trading strategies (“transient”
institutions), earnings management through R&D cuts is very likely); Brian J. Bushee,
Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings over Long-Run Value? 2-3 (Apr.
1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=161739 (showing
a weak institutional preference for near-term earnings amongst institutions as a whole,
but a strong preference for near-term earnings within the transient subset, along with a
concomitant tendency to hold companies whose stock is mispriced); see also Mei Cheng et
al., Earnings Guidance and Managerial Myopia 1-4 (Nov. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=851545 (using voluntary earnings guidance
as a proxy for managing to the market). There is also survey evidence of this phenomenon. See Graham et al., supra note 153, at 32-35, 35 fig.5 (surveying 401 chief financial
officers and reporting that nearly eighty percent said that they would decrease discretionary spending on R&D or advertising to meet earnings targets, and just over fifty-five percent said that they would delay a new project despite a small sacrifice in value); see also
John R. Graham et al., Value Destruction and Financial Reporting Decisions 9-10 (Sept.
6, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=871215 (reporting that only fifty-nine percent of the same group of executives would approve a high
net present value project if it entailed missing earnings by $0.10).
155
See Daniel Bergstresser & Thomas Philippon, CEO Incentives and Earnings Management, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 511, 512-13 (2006) (finding evidence that CEOs whose compensation is more closely tied to share price “more aggressively use discretionary components of earnings to affect their firms’ reported performance”). Otherwise, the
underinvestment problem can be expected to be at its most acute when management
has particularly strong incentives to please the market, as happens when new equity
finance is needed or with takeover pressure.
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156

syncratic” volatility.
The more particular implication, according to
proponents of one reading of the data, is that market traders have
157
How
somehow obtained enhanced access to private information.
that might have happened, however, is not explained. The evidence,
158
moreover, is indirect, inferential, and in dispute.
The literature
159
holds out at least four competing explanations of the data, resulting
in a state of explanatory gridlock.
156

According to one study, it was thirty times higher in 1997 than in 1962. See
John Y. Campbell et al., Have Individual Stocks Become More Volatile? An Empirical Exploration of Idiosyncratic Risk, 56 J. FIN. 1, 20, 24 fig.5 (2001) (showing that variance for a
typical firm was thirty times higher in 1997 than in 1962, while the equally weighted
2
average R statistic of a market model declined from 0.26 to 0.08 across the same pe2
riod). The studies follow from Richard Roll, R , 43 J. FIN. 541 (1988), which showed
that market models could explain a lesser quantum of daily volatility than previously
had been assumed. Id. at 542-43.
157
If that is the case, then the information asymmetry problem has been ameliorated to some extent. Carrying this point a step further, some proponents posit that
good managers look to the stock price to get good instructions for business policy,
claiming not only well-informed but accurate stock prices. See Artyom Durnev et al.,
Does Greater Firm-Specific Return Variation Mean More or Less Informed Stock Pricing?, 41 J.
ACCT. RES. 797, 798-99 (2003) (evidencing an empirical connection between low R 2
and the informativeness of the stock price, and, by implication, its accuracy); Art Durnev et al., Value-Enhancing Capital Budgeting and Firm-Specific Stock Return Variation, 59 J.
FIN. 65, 89 (2004) [hereinafter Durnev et al., Value-Enhancing Capital Budgeting] (find2
ing better-quality investment decisionmaking at low R firms, thus suggesting that informative stock prices facilitate efficient investment); see also Qi Chen et al., Price Informativeness and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Price, 20 REV. FIN. STUD. 619, 620-23 (2007)
(showing a further correlation between stock price variation and the sensitivity of the
firm’s level of investment to its stock price).
158
Even the studies’ authors point to their weaknesses: the evidence as to price
informativeness is only indirect, the implications are a matter of “theoretical conjecture,” and other factors could be involved. Durnev et al., Value-Enhancing Capital Budgeting, supra note 157, at 69; see also Chen et al., supra note 157, at 625 (“Admittedly, it is . . .
possible that our measures are correlated with other factors . . . . We believe that our extensive robustness tests mitigate this concern to a large extent. But, it remains possible
that something else is behind our results.”). Idiosyncratic volatility, then, does not prove
that the price has become better informed and more accurate—it only suggests such.
159
The stepped-up volatility could also reflect (1) trading “frenzy unrelated to
concrete information,” Roll, supra note 156, at 566; (2) increased cash flow volatility
within the companies, Campbell et al., supra note 156, at 37-40; (3) speedier information dissemination over time, id. at 39; or (4) increased volatility in investor discount
rates, id. at 39-40. Empirical evidence has been marshaled to support each of the four
alternatives. See Steven X. Wei & Chu Zhang, Why Did Individual Stocks Become More Volatile?, 79 J. BUS. 259, 261-62 (2006) (showing that a decline in return on equity and,
hence, greater uncertainty explain the increase in volatility, and attributing two-thirds
of the increased volatility to newly listed firms); Yexiao Xu & Burton G. Malkiel, Investigating the Behavior of Idiosyncratic Volatility, 76 J. BUS. 613, 614 (2003) (finding from
cross-sectional regressions that idiosyncratic volatility is related to trading volume, institutional ownership, and a growth posture); Michael W. Brandt et al., The Idiosyncratic
Volatility Puzzle: Time Trend or Speculative Episodes? 13-14 (Univ. of Tex. McCombs Sch.
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Gridlock or not, evidence that the market has become better informed does not by itself imply that information asymmetries have actually decreased. Both public and nonpublic information may have
improved, leaving the gap between the two unchanged. Consequently, there is simply no evidence to prove the assertion that the gap between private and public information available to the market has narrowed materially.
C. Heterogeneous Expectations
We now turn to the emerging literature of heterogeneous expecta160
tions. This line of financial economics has developed in an attempt
to explain pricing bubbles, but it has broader implications for the debate over shareholder empowerment. Not long ago, many thought of
bubbles as historical anomalies that happened before financial markets
became as efficient as they are today. The historical parade of bubbles,
of Bus., Research Paper No. FIN-02-09, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1141219 (conjecturing that idiosyncratic volatility is related to speculative euphoria);
Jason Fink et al., IPO Vintage and the Rise of Idiosyncratic Risk 12-17 (Feb. 4, 2005)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=661321 (showing a
significant rise in idiosyncratic risk stemming from a drastic increase in the number of
younger, riskier IPO firms in the market and demonstrating that after controlling for
the proportion of young firms there is no time trend respecting idiosyncratic risk).
Other studies have begun to undermine some of the literature’s basic assumptions. The conclusion that prices have become better informed is refuted by a study
that ties the stepped-up volatility to increased opacity due to deteriorating accounting
practices and increased dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. See Shiv Rajgopal & Mohan
Venkatachalam, Financial Reporting Quality and Idiosyncratic Return Volatility over
the Last Four Decades 1-6 (Sept. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=650081. The consistent upward trend of volatility has also
been challenged. See Brandt et al., supra, at 6-8, 37 fig.2 (showing that the idiosyncratic volatility trend spiked during the period 2002–2004 and declined sharply thereafter
through 2007, and identifying an earlier but shorter-lived trend toward increased volatility during the period 1926–1933); Paul Brockman & Xuemin (Sterling) Yan, The
Time-Series Behavior and Pricing of Idiosyncratic Volatility: Evidence From 1926 to
1962, at 12-14 (Sept. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1117284 (documenting a downward trend in idiosyncratic volatility from
1926–1962).
160
For the original model, see Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of
Opinion, 32 J. FIN. 1151, 1151 (1977). We do not claim to be the first to introduce this
work in the legal literature. For two papers that have previously discussed its implications, see Lynn A. Stout, How Efficient Markets Undervalue Stocks: CAPM and ECMH Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Disagreement, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 475, 482-91 (1997),
and Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New
Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 639-50 (2003). For heterogeneous-expectations approaches to merger pricing, see Richard Booth, Discounts and Other Mysteries of Corporate
Finance, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1053 (1991), and Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really
Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235 (1990).
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and the busts that followed, include the Dutch tulip bubble of 1630–
1637, the South Sea bubble of 1710–1720, the British railway boom
from 1845–1846, the subsequent U.S. railway boom and bust in 1873,
and the dramatic rise and crash of the U.S. stock market of the 1920s.
But the bubble-to-bust experience of Japan between the 1980s and
161
1990s and our own recent Internet bubble caused researchers to ask
how such events can occur in a world where financial markets are
thought to be generally efficient. As a consequence, explanations for
bubbles are being integrated into broader financial models.
Heterogeneous expectations models integrate pricing bubbles into the conceptual framework of “high church” financial economics by
assuming rational behavior by all investors. Investors are not only rational but assumed to have access to the same information, to employ
standard valuation techniques, and to trade on fundamentals rather
than on noise. The models depart from the asymmetric information
literature in two critical respects. First, the models assume symmetric
information not only among investors but between those inside and
outside of the corporation. Second, the models drop the classical assumption of homogeneous investor expectations. Here, each investor
is informed by the same set of information but develops her own esti162
mate of fundamental value, an estimate that at any given moment
may differ from the market price. Some investors form more optimistic expectations, while others are more pessimistic.
Models with heterogeneity of expectations have three primary implications for corporate governance: (1) the market price may no
longer represent the views of the shareholders as a whole or even of a
majority of the shareholders; (2) the market price may not represent
the pro rata value of the corporation; and (3) mispricing is likely to
affect investment behavior within the corporation, and this investment
behavior may be detrimental to the corporation.
1. The Models
In the leading heterogeneous expectations models, investors
overweigh their own estimates of firm value and undervalue the estimates of other investors. This generates optimists and pessimists and
trading where the optimists buy stock from the pessimists. As infor161

For a heterogeneous-expectations analysis of the Japanese bubble, see Robert B.
Barsky, The Japanese Bubble: A ‘Heterogeneous’ Approach (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 15052, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15052.
162
This is frequently framed in terms of Tobin’s marginal Q.
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mation flows, any particular investor may change from being optimistic to pessimistic or vice-versa. Such changes in position explain the
163
high volume of trading that is typically observed during bubbles.
Critically, the models depict stock prices as having two components: first, the fundamental value of the stock; and second, the
present owner’s option to sell her stock to an even more optimistic in164
vestor.
The result is that, even in equilibrium, the stock price may
exceed the valuation of the most optimistic investor. Even as this investor values the firm based on optimistic expectations as to future
value, the speculative component makes this investor willing to pay an
even higher price for the stock because of the option value of selling
165
the stock to an even more optimistic investor. As a result, prices can
differ systematically from fundamental value.
This prediction will sound radical to an observer steeped in
166
ECMH and CAPM.
But this literature in fact resonates quite well
with “high church” financial economics. We note three important
points of connection.
First, there is no claim that financial markets always operate in a
state where heterogeneity of expectations causes prices to diverge
from fundamental value expectations. Heterogeneity is likely to occur
when there is a change in technology, when glamour companies
emerge, or when companies running newer businesses with less estab167
lished track records become an important part of the market.
Second, the literature yields a picture of bubbles that can be read
together with semi-strong ECMH. Bubbles have two defining empiri163

See José A. Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, Overconfidence and Speculative Bubbles, 111
J. POL. ECON. 1183, 1185 (2003) (noting that optimists and pessimists oscillate, changing their forecasts as information flows).
164
For the original model of speculative behavior in a marketplace, see J. Michael
Harrison & David M. Kreps, Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market with Heterogeneous Expectations, 92 Q.J. ECON. 323, 325-28 (1978).
165
The more pronounced the differences of opinion among investors, the more
salient the speculative element. See Patrick Bolton et al., Executive Compensation and
Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets, 73 REV. ECON. STUD. 577, 578-80 (2006)
(explaining the effects of differences of opinion on speculative behavior and thus fluctuating stock valuation).
166
If CAPM’s assumption of homogeneous expectation is relaxed, and some investors are well-informed while others are misinformed, the theory’s prediction no longer
holds. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Disagreement, Tastes, and Asset Prices,
83 J. FIN. ECON. 667, 669 (2007) (concluding that disagreement between dissimilarly
informed investors moves pricing away from CAPM).
167
See Stavros Panageas, The Neoclassical Theory of Investment in Speculative
Markets 22-23 (Apr. 16, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=720464.
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cal markers: (1) a period of rapidly rising prices followed by a subsequent collapse; and (2) an unusually high volume of trading that cannot be explained by changes in fundamentals. Under the first
er, a bubble can only be identified after it has burst; rapidly rising
stock prices do not constitute a bubble unless or until followed by a
168
sharp decline or collapse. Ex post identification is not problematic
for semi-strong efficiency, however, since there is no claim that a
ble can be identified ex ante. It follows that there is no implicit claim
that a contrarian trading strategy can be developed that yields reliable
profits from a bubble.
Third, the models do assume constraints on short selling that prevent arbitrageurs from eliminating upward bias in the stock price
stemming from optimistic purchases. This assumption might have put
169
them outside the “high church” tent twenty years ago. Today, however, the economic literature recognizes real-world limitations on the
170
arbitrage correction function.

168

For example, then–Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan made his famous
speech on “irrational exuberance” in December 1996. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed.
Reserve Bd., Remarks at the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of The American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: The Challenge of Central Banking in a
Democratic Society (Dec. 5, 1996), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961205.htm. The stock market would come close to
doubling over the next several years, with the bubble only bursting in late 2000.
169
Traditional ECMH proponents never denied that many investors are uninformed and that their trading activities push the market price away from fundamental
value. They instead posited that mispricing presents a risk-free arbitrage opportunity
and that the arbitrage corrective will be complete, assuring that stocks have flat demand curves and insulating market prices from shocks stemming from shifts in supply
and demand having no relation to fundamental value. See Myron S. Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution Versus Price Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Prices, 45 J. BUS. 179, 179-82 (1972) (discussing various hypotheses regarding arbitrage
opportunities resulting from market imperfections).
170
Arbitrage in corporate stocks is risky. Individual stocks do not have perfect
substitutes. Arbitrage hedges accordingly carry the risk that the two streams of returns
do not cancel out. See Jeffrey Wurgler & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, Does Arbitrage Flatten
Demand Curves for Stocks?, 75 J. BUS. 583, 585-86 (2002) (reporting the results of an empirical test of stocks that join the S&P 500 and finding that no substitutes that would
hedge away more than twenty-five percent of the daily return variance could be located). That risk must be compensated for by additional returns, which in turn cause a
reduction in the number of attractive plays and reduce the volume of corrective trading. The smaller the number of corrective traders, the more risky their plays become.
Moreover, even if an arbitrageur’s fundamental-value analysis is flawless, a given play
succeeds only when the rest of the market comes to share the analysis and moves the
stock in the predicted direction. As the time to correction lengthens, so does the
play’s duration and risk. All of this calls for a substantial base of capital, which further
depresses the number of potential players.
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2. Implications for Business Policy and Corporate Governance
The heterogeneous expectations models change a single classical
assumption, homogeneous investor expectations, to drive a wedge between stock prices and fundamental value without resort to information asymmetries. Information asymmetry and heterogeneous expectations thus emerge as separate tracks for projecting the potential
adverse effects of managing to the market.
a. Implications for Shareholder Voting
When shareholder proponents ask for shareholder voting on
business-policy matters, they assume that the stock price offers a reliable proxy for fundamental value and so provides the shareholders
with informational guidance. The information picture changes with
heterogeneous expectations. Increases in the speculative component of
the stock price provide little or no information on fundamental value
enhancement, and a shareholder basing a vote on market price information could be greatly misled in supporting the company’s management. Shareholder voting would reward those companies whose prices
had an increased speculative component. As a consequence, managers
interested in securing shareholder support for a business decision, such
as executive compensation, would have an incentive to skew business
policy in directions that excited speculative reactions in the market.

Regulatory and institutional constraints also dampen demand for shorting activity.
See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty
Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 725-31 (2003) (analyzing the difficulties of successful arbitrage in financial markets); see also Andrei Shleifer & Robert W.
Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35, 38-43 (1997) (positing a model for agency
constraints on arbitrage activity). But cf. Paul Asquith et al., Short Interest, Institutional
Ownership, and Stock Returns, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 245 (2005) (showing empirically that
only a handful of stocks on the U.S. markets are short-sale constrained due to an unavailability of loanable shares). The average ratio of short interest to shares outstanding in February 2000 was only two percent. See Eli Ofek & Matthew Richardson, DotCom Mania: The Rise and Fall of Internet Stock Prices, 58 J. FIN. 1113, 1118 (2003)
(calculating average short interest to be approximately two percent of shares outstanding as compared to almost three percent for Internet stocks). This is an increase from
a less than one-percent average during the period 1973–1979. See Stephen Figlewski,
The Informational Effects of Restrictions on Short Sales: Some Empirical Evidence, 16 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 463, 471-72, 472 tbl.1 (1981) (listing the average short interest
for stocks on the S&P 500 from 1973–1979 as a percentage of total stock outstanding).
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b. Implications for Business and Investment Strategy
We now inquire into the distortionary potential of speculative
prices for decisionmaking in corporate boardrooms, irrespective of
shareholder voting. The models have two noteworthy features: first,
their time frames cover only the period during which the bubble is
still growing, thus excluding the effects of the bubble’s bursting;
second, they assume that the managers’ duty is to maximize the stock
price for the benefit of the current shareholders. Given these parameters, what is a fiduciary to do in a speculative market?
The directions are clear. In order to maximize the wealth of the
corporation’s current shareholders, management should first sell additional overpriced stock, thereby effectively lowering the company’s
171
cost of capital.
Having sold the stock, managers should then approve increased capital expenditures. In a model from Stavros Panageas, this investment serves two “efficiency” purposes. “One is to increase the ‘long run fundamentals’ of the company according to the
beliefs of the current owners,” since the high stock price presumably indi172
cates a high present value of growth opportunities. The other is to
increase the speculative element, permitting the current owners to
173
capture a larger resale value when they sell their stock.
174
José Scheinkman and Wei Xiong reach a similar conclusion.
Like Panageas, they see stock ownership as including an option to
175
Patrick Bolton joins
profit from other investors’ overvaluations.
Scheinkman and Xiong by pointing this out in an article on executive
176
In this model, executives divide their time between
compensation.
increasing the fundamental value of the corporation and increasing
177
the value of the speculative component in the stock price. In order
171

See Panageas, supra note 167, at 17 (noting that new investment does not increase long-run fundamental value but rather short-term resale price).
172
Id. (emphasis added).
173
See id. (noting that the speculative element arises because of disagreement over
the fundamental valuation of the corporation and captures the current owners’ resale
premium).
174
Their focus is on management self-interest, and they find that managers may
themselves profit by adopting strategies that boost the option or speculative component. See Scheinkman & Xiong, supra note 163, at 1208 (“Firm managers may be able
to profit by adopting strategies that boost the speculative component.”).
175
Id. at 1184.
176
See Bolton et al., supra note 165, at 578 (“The holder of a share then has not
only a claim to future dividends but also an option to sell the stock to a more optimistic investor in the future.”).
177
See id. at 579 (explaining managers’ short-term behavior in terms of the speculative component).
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to maximize the wealth of the current shareholders, the optimal compensation contract actually “overemphasize[s] short-term stock performance to induce managers to take actions that may increase the
178
speculative component in stock prices.” Indeed, “[w]hen it is possible for future investors to overvalue the firm due to their optimism, it
is in the interest of current shareholders to cater to such potential
sentiment even at the expense of firm long-term fundamental val179
ue.” In other words, it is in the interests of current shareholders for
managers to have a short-termist view so as to maintain the speculative
element in the stock price and give the current shareholders the possibility of selling to even more optimistic investors.
To get a better sense of the models’ implications, hypothesize a
stodgy technology company (hereafter “Stodgy”) in the year 1998, at
the heart of the high-tech bubble. Its managers want more momentum in the company’s profile. They get an opportunity to buy an Internet operation that recently has gone public (hereafter “Cybershares”). Cybershares has never made a profit and is investing heavily
in a number of innovative, web-related projects. Prospects for revenues, however, are shadowy. Cybershares’ stock, initially sold to the
public for $20, now trades at $60. Stodgy’s managers negotiate the
acquisition of Cybershares at a still higher premium price and submit
the transaction to a special committee of its independent directors for
approval. The independent directors take a dim view of the Internet’s
revenue-generating prospects and believe Cybershares to be overpriced. They do, however, expect the Internet price bubble to persist
for at least the intermediate term, even as they perceive little fundamental value and predict an eventual bust. The shareholders are expected to favor the merger overwhelmingly. How should the independent directors of Stodgy vote?
Within the parameters of the heterogeneous expectations models,
Stodgy’s directors should vote in favor of the acquisition because the
models define their fiduciary duties in terms of present stockholders,
and the deal holds out the benefit of a speculative price enhancement
for the company’s stock that would generate present stock price maximization. The result holds for investment policy in general: even if the
purchase of Cybershares reduces the fundamental value of Stodgy, the
purchase improves the wealth of its current shareholders as long as the

178
179

Id. at 578.
Id. at 597.
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increase in the speculative component of the stock price outweighs the
180
diminution of value in the fundamental component of the stock price.
As already noted, the models focus only on pricing effects inside
the bubble and do not factor in the likelihood of the bubble bursting.
Let us relax this parameter in the merger case, allowing market participants to factor in the possibility of an eventual pricing correction.
We now find Stodgy’s directors facing a difficult choice. An investment made to increase the speculative element in the price but lacking in supporting fundamental value will benefit only those who sell
before the bubble bursts, with longer-term holders and new investors
181
The directors have no inside inleft holding the deflated remains.
formation but believe that the probability of the bubble bursting is
higher than the probability assessment built into the market price.
Unfortunately, the directors cannot convince the optimistic market
that their own pessimistic expectations are correct. As long as the
bubble persists, it will appear that they turned down a good deal in
the eyes of their shareholders.
In the constrained context of the models, including their interpretation of corporate law, the directors should ignore their own
business judgment. The result follows from the models’ assumption
of symmetric information. Given this, the directors’ conclusion differs
from the market’s only with respect to subjective expectations about
future outcomes; it does not follow from a position of informational
superiority. There is no reason for the directors to assume that they
have a better answer than the market; accordingly, they should give
the current shareholders what they want.
c. Implications for the Legal Model of the Corporation
The prevailing legal model works differently because it instructs
the directors to maximize the value of the “corporation” and not the
stock price. Remember that in the bubble models, the stock price has
both a fundamental value component and a speculative component.
In our hypothetical, the speculative component is positive, which is
why the merger can reduce the fundamental value yet still result in a
higher stock price. The move to the legal model permits the Stodgy
180

See Christopher Polk & Paola Sapienza, The Stock Market and Corporate Investment:
A Test of Catering Theory, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 187, 187-90 (2009) (arguing that managers
may rationally make investments that decrease long-term value in order to secure
short-term gains).
181
See id. (arguing that shorter-term investors will benefit from “catering” on the
part of management).
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directors to take the fundamental value information into account in
making their decision. This gives them a basis to vote against the
merger in accord with their own business judgment.
Thus, the legal model, in holding out “corporate” value maximization, opens up a zone of discretion. Within it, Stodgy’s directors may
ignore the most optimistic shareholders who set the market price.
Because the legal model imposes no duty to manage to the market
when the directors’ views about value differ from the market’s view,
the directors have no duty to approve the merger simply for the purpose of allowing those shareholders to sell their stock to more optimistic shareholders. More generally, the legal model permits the directors to consider a longer time horizon. In the hypothetical, longterm value is maximized accordingly.
Compare this with the Cybershares merger case under a hypothetical legal regime that models the directors as agents of the shareholders. This makes the merger much more difficult to resist, reducing
the zone of directorial freedom of action to maximize long-term value. The market, which serves as a proxy for shareholder preferences,
favors the deal. Under an agency model, the principal’s preferences
should control. The directors can still vote against the deal, citing
fundamental value as a defense. But this defense no longer provides a
complete answer under the law because it privileges the interests of
one subset of principals (the pessimistic, long-term holders) over
another (the optimistic, short-term holders). Here, where the assumption of a unitary shareholder has failed, the board must choose
winners and losers within the group of principals. Arguably the market price, as objective money on the table, holds out the more prin182
cipled decision rule.
d. Controlling Shareholders Compared
In the above cases, directors face a dilemma in exercising their
business judgment when it conflicts with the views of their sharehold182

What of the impact of the shareholder franchise in the hypothetical? More
facts would be needed. If the directors approve the merger, the subsequent shareholder vote will be in favor of the merger, but only so long as the bubble has not yet
burst. Indeed, if the pessimistic shareholders are not locked into their shareholdings,
they will vote yes on the ground that the best course in the wake of board approval is to
vote yes and sell. Only shareholders that, for whatever reason, cannot sell will vote no.
If the board turns down the merger, no shareholder vote occurs. The shareholder
franchise comes into play at the next annual meeting. If the bubble has not burst, the
directors presumably will be punished. Indeed, even if the bubble has burst, shareholders may still be inclined toward punishment due to the missed opportunity to sell.
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ers as expressed in market prices. The heterogeneous expectations
models contrast the case where there is a controlling shareholder, positing that controlling shareholders are likely to have a longer-term ra183
ther than a shorter-term outlook.
The incentive shift toward long-term value maximization arises because the controller cannot or does not want to sell her shares, despite
what she believes to be an inflated price. Constraints on the ability of
controlling insiders to sell their stock have a number of sources, including IPO-related resale restrictions and negative tax consequences from
capital gains realization. Perhaps more importantly, the sale of a large
184
enough block causes the seller to lose her power as a controller.
The locked-in controller will adopt a conservative investment policy consistent with the view that she will still be in control when the
bubble bursts and the speculative component of the stock price goes
to zero. In particular, she has no incentive to consider speculative mispricing when determining investment policy and no reason to accept
negative-net-present-value investments that increase the value of the
speculative component. On the other hand, the controlling shareholder can profitably adopt one prong of the noncontrollers’ shorttermist strategy by causing the firm to sell additional shares into the
overpriced market, thereby lowering the firm’s cost of capital. Since
the funds so raised need not be used for investment purposes, they
185
can be put aside to repurchase the shares after the bubble has burst.
e. Implications for Management Compensation
The perverse effects predicted by the models follow only to the extent that the managers have the option of selling into the market and
do not hesitate to exercise it. As we have seen, when frictions prevent
sales, the managers have no stake in managing to the speculative ele183

See Panageas, supra note 167, at 21 (“Long-termism is just the extent of ‘entrenchment’ of current ‘major’ shareholders in the firm.”).
184
The controller might also face insider trading restrictions under Rule 10b-5.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
185
See Bolton et al., supra note 165, at 595 (explaining that during speculative episodes, “the cost of capital is below the firm’s long-run value”). The reduction in the
cost of capital is consistent with the controller’s belief that the expected return on the
shares will be lower in the future.
Note that the controlling shareholder’s time horizon lengthens to the extent that
access to the trading markets is restricted. Given a partial constraint on liquidation of
its position, the firm’s investment policy would be partially open to short-term incentives—the controlling shareholder would determine investment using “some weighted
average between share price and long term value.” Panageas, supra note 167, at 22.
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ment in the stock price, and fundamental value information deter186
mines investment policy.
It follows that equity-based compensation
schemes that lack constraints on market sales exacerbate the subop187
It also follows that compensation plans
timal-investment problem.
should seek to mimic as closely as possible the incentives of a controlling shareholder, the shareholder who will be deterred from selling
into an overpriced market by the need to maintain the control posi188
tion and its accompanying value.
Now consider the impact of shareholder empowerment respecting
the terms of compensation plans, given these choices. Presumably,
shareholders who are asked the hypothetical question of whether they
prefer directors to have long- or short-term incentives will most of the
time express a preference for the long-term. This is because the longterm strategy maximizes the current stock price, at least in normal
times when stocks trade without a speculative element. Given these
conditions, shareholders can be expected to support compensation
plans that constrain executive resales.
Contrast this with a company that has an upward-trending stock
price subject to speculative influence. Here, shareholder voting preferences should shift to follow the stock price. After all, if the stock price is
inflated, it is because the shareholders have bid it up in the hope that
the trend will continue. Resale constraints are undesirable because they
would discourage the managers from stoking the trend. From a policy
perspective, then, shareholder empowerment can work at cross-purposes
with the goal of reducing value-destroying short-termist behavior.
D. Summary
We have shown that information asymmetries can open a gulf between managing to maximize long-term fundamental value and managing to maximize the market price of the stock. We have also shown that
speculative pricing under heterogeneous expectations can have the

186
See Stavros Panageas, Speculation, Overpricing, and Investment—Theory and
Empirical Evidence 17 (Nov. 15, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
icf.som.yale.edu/pdf/seminar03-04/stravros.pdf (noting that if managers do not have
frictionless access to markets, investment decisions are based on fundamental value).
187
See Bolton et al., supra note 165, at 578-79 (explaining that an incentive compensation scheme keyed to short-term stock price enhancement at the sacrifice of
long-term value can be optimal for a group of speculative shareholders).
188
Short-termist incentives will not, however, be entirely absent. A controlling shareholder retains the incentive to sell additional shares into the overpriced market in order to
reduce the cost of capital, an incentive shared with all managers of all companies.
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same result. In both cases, managing to the market leads to suboptimal
results, with negative implications for shareholder empowerment.
When market prices are taken as governance inputs they accordingly need to be interpreted as a matter of business judgment. In our view,
the prevailing legal model gets it right when it remits the judgment to
the directors and their appointed managers. A recent empirical study
confirms that directors do indeed use their discretion to the advantage
of fundamental value. The study finds that managers look to the stock
price when investing only in limited circumstances, and when so doing
they successfully separate the fundamental value signal from the spe189
This positive report card underscores the case favorculative signal.
ing the prevailing legal model’s zone of directorial discretion.
IV. SHAREHOLDERS, MANAGERS, MARKETS, AND THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008
In this Part we turn to the recent financial crisis and the claim that
shareholder empowerment is the regulatory response that will restore
190
trust in the system. Leading executives of financial firms—particularly
those whose firms had to be saved by the federal government—have
emerged as the poster children for the evildoers who caused the crisis.
But did the problem arise because the managers were fiduciaries who
violated the shareholders’ trust, or because the managers were acting
more like agents by managing to the market? Does manager culpability
191
translate, as Arthur Levitt would have us believe, into a case for shareholder empowerment? Or did the shareholders take the lead on the
road to crisis, rewarding the financial companies that took on the most
leverage with higher stock prices, and penalizing those that did not?
In Section A we examine the financial crisis through the lens of
the shareholders of the financial firms at its epicenter. In so doing,
we highlight the place of managing to the market in the chain of causation. As we show, the evidence suggests that shareholders first fell in
love, and then fell out of love, with the financial companies that were
taking on the most risk and the most leverage. In Section B we turn to
the question of the proper role of corporate governance in post-crisis
189

See Tor-Erik Bakke & Toni M. Whited, Which Firms Follow the Market? An
Analysis of Corporate Investment Decisions 3 (Nov. 18, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=891570 (finding “that investment does
respond to legitimate information in price movements, but only for firms that rely on
outside equity financing and whose shares are not mispriced” (emphasis added)).
190
See supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text.
191
See supra text accompanying note 8.
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law reform, focusing on executive compensation and its central role
both in fomenting the crisis and in fixing the system. Doing so removes shareholder empowerment from the reform picture.
A. Financial Risk and Shareholder Inputs
Figure 2 tracks the performance of the subset of bank stocks included in the S&P 500 index against that of the entire S&P 500 from
January 2000 to March 2009. It shows that prior to the autumn of 2007,
the banks handsomely outperformed the market as a whole, in rough
192
They then underwent a precipitcorrelation with its ups and downs.
ous fall that presaged and outstripped that of the market as a whole,
which began a year later. We note that Figure 2 understates the performance gaps. The relative weight of the financial sector within the S&P
193
500 grew from 13.0% in 1999 to 22.3% in 2006, only to retreat back to
194
13.6% in mid-2009.
It follows that the S&P 500, excluding finance,
neither rose nor fell as much as the line indicates.
The stock market favored the banks between 2000 and 2007 because of rising earnings that resulted from wide spreads between expected returns on lending and the costs of increasing leverage in a
stable economic environment. The problem, which became more
and more apparent in 2007, was that the banks had been making
high-yield loans into the residential-mortgage sector (including, but
not limited to, subprime loans) that were much riskier than had been
195
appreciated. Securitization had turned these risky loans into AAA
paper on the assumption that the price of the real estate securing the
196
At the same time, the rise in real esloans would continue to rise.
tate prices was built in part on increasing demand for housing fueled
197
by ever-riskier real estate financing.
192

The correlation of the two number series is 0.48.
Bespoke Investment Group, Current and Historical Sector Weightings of the
S&P 500 (Apr. 24, 2008), http://bespokeinvest.typepad.com/bespoke/2008/04/
current-and-his.html.
194
Select Sector SPDR Trust, Sector Returns by Year 1999–2009, at 2, http://
www.sectorspdr.com/shared/pdf/SPDR-Periodic_table-web.pdf (last visited Jan. 15,
2010).
195
See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 133 (1994) (explaining how securitization works and how companies benefit from it).
196
See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Market Shock: AAA Rating May Be Junk, N.Y. TIMES, July 20,
2007, at C1 (explaining the riskiness of AAA securities backed by subprime mortgages).
197
See, e.g., Andrey Pavlov & Susan Wachter, Subprime Lending and House Price Volatility
3 (Univ. of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 08-33, 2009), available at
193
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Figure 2: S&P 500/S&P 500 Banks, 2000–2009
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Was the crash of financial stocks the result of a system that gave
managers too much power, or did it follow from managers catering to
stockholders as they expressed their views through stock prices? Some
evidence to answer the question can be found by breaking out individual financial stocks that were the poster children of the crisis, with
each playing a different role. Figure 3 depicts the individual share
prices of Countrywide Financial, JPMorgan Chase, and Bank of America against the S&P 500 Bank index. Countrywide is now one of the
clear villains in the story. But it also was the clear market favorite, at
least until mid-2007. Countrywide expanded at a torrid pace after
2000 by making riskier loans, both in the subprime and prime sectors,
and financing the expansion on a short-term basis in the repurchase
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1316891 (linking recent use of aggressive mortgage lending instruments and the underlying house price volatility).
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198

and commercial paper markets.
Countrywide’s line in Figure 3
stops in mid-2008 because portfolio losses forced it into a defensive
merger with Bank of America.
It appears the stock market failed to appreciate the risks held out
by the sector’s higher fliers. In our view, this lack of appreciation can
be traced partly to the information asymmetry problem described in
Section III.B. As we noted there, markets can easily fail to measure
199
the risk factors incorporated into discount rates. What was unusual
here was the magnitude of the underestimation.
A full account of these events is beyond the scope of this Article,
but a few useful points should be noted. Banks historically have been
low-beta stocks. The banks, operating with less leverage than recently
has been the case, made their profits on the spread between borrowing and lending rates. Since this spread does not generate enormous
returns, the banks were steady earners with high dividends. Furthermore, by doing their best to match the duration of their assets with

198

In 2003, Countrywide was the star of its sector, having returned 23,000% on its
equity between 1982 and 2003. See Shawn Tully, Meet the 23,000% Stock, FORTUNE,
Sept. 15, 2003, at 204 (“Most amazing of all is that Countrywide boasts the best stock
market performance of any financial services company in the FORTUNE 500 . . . .”).
Countrywide built itself into an industry leader with a strictly prime-lending operation,
entering the subprime market only in 1999. Between 1999 and 2003, Countrywide got
its growth in earnings and market share from an aggressive mortgage refinancing operation. That strategy depended on historically low interest rates. When rates climbed
in 2003, it had to look elsewhere to continue its stellar performance. See Christine Richard & David Feldheim, Asset-Backed Securities Gain Favor, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2004, at
C5 (concluding that investors were moving money into asset-backed securities, creating
a possible “bonanza” for consumer borrowing). Subprime lending was a part of the
solution but only undertaken with a view to securitizing all mortgages originated.
Prime lending remained a much greater part of the business. But here the company
took a notably aggressive approach, originating adjustable-rate mortgages highly exposed to declines in real estate prices. See James R. Haggerty, Do Countrywide’s Loans
Stack Up?, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2006, at C3 (raising the possibility that Countrywide was
less cautious than rivals in granting adjustable-rate mortgages). The right side of
Countrywide’s balance sheet also changed. Shareholders’ equity, sixteen percent of
total assets in 1999, declined to seven percent of total assets in 2006. Compare Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-4 (Feb. 29, 2000), with
Countrywide Fin. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-3 (Feb. 28, 2008). In 1999,
the overwhelming portion of Countrywide’s outside borrowing was medium term. By
2006, it was relying on short-term credit in the form of repurchase obligations and
commercial paper. See Countrywide Fin. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-3
(Feb. 28, 2008) (reporting that repurchase obligations, while constituting 0% of liabilities in 1999, were 23% in 2006, while longer-term “notes payable” declined from 79%
of liabilities in 1999 to 39% in 2006).
199
See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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their liabilities and maintaining large reserves of safe, liquid assets,
200
they contained their risk, and hence their returns.
Figure 3: Sectoral Variations
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This all changed as some banks made riskier loans, became more
involved in buying and selling securitized assets, and operated with
more leverage. Such a change in business strategy meant a move to
greater expected returns and greater risk. In the stable economic environment of 2003–2007, these banks generated much higher profits
with little volatility. The stock market fell in love with this combination of unexpectedly high returns and apparently constant low risk.
Higher stock prices resulted.
For a management dedicated to maximizing shareholder value, the
instruction manual was clear: get with the program by generating more
risky loans and doing so with more leverage. Any bank whose managers
failed to implement the new math of high returns and low beta got
200

For a description of the process by which banks went from regulatory constraint to high-risk investing, see RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE
CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 41-74 (2009).
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201

stuck with a low stock price. For an example, look at JPMorgan Chase
in Figure 3. It suffered from loan and other investment losses from
2001 to 2004, and then, as the housing bubble expanded, recovered
202
Consequently, its
while adhering to strict risk-management policies.
stock lagged behind the bank index until the crisis began to unfold and
then overtook the index. Unsurprisingly, its managers labored under
203
considerable pressure to follow the strategies of competing banks.
JPMorgan Chase had merged with a view to dominating the securitiza204
In 2005, the new bank cranked up a production line
tion business.
for collateralized debt obligations based on subprime mortgages but
never flicked the start switch because its managers could not find a way
205
to make the risk/return numbers add up.
As long as the economy was expanding, the riskier business strategies worked well. But when the economy slowed, the higher risk became observable. High returns went along with higher risk after all,
and the realization caused stock prices to fall.
Now let us turn back the clock to 2005 and hypothesize a newly
appointed CEO at a bank that has been pursuing the highgrowth/high-leverage strategy. The bank has been originating mortgages, both prime and subprime, whose soundness depends on continued rising real estate prices. Although it funnels most of its subprime originations into securitizations, some of these mortgages will
be retained on its increasingly levered balance sheet. How would this
CEO evaluate the policy? The stock market has been sending a strong
signal that the shareholders love the new approach. If the CEO is
shareholder sensitive, she will be inclined to view the new strategy as
terrific. If that is the case, then the bank’s fortunes are set. However,
suppose the new CEO, who has had a long banking career, believes
that the market is underestimating the risk of the high-growth/highreturn strategy built around originating risky mortgages on a more levered balance sheet. The new CEO accordingly decides against taking
201

For a smaller bank, that meant becoming an attractive merger target as the industry concentrated.
202
See KATE KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS: THE LAST 72 HOURS OF BEAR STEARNS, THE
TOUGHEST FIRM ON WALL STREET 194-96 (2009) (describing JPMorgan Chase CEO
Jamie Dimon’s approach as “steer[ing] the bank away from risky holdings”); GILLIAN
TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. MORGAN WAS
CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE 110-142 (2009)
(“Dimon believed strongly that risks must be properly managed . . . .”).
203
TETT, supra note 202, at 125-42.
204
Id. at 120.
205
Id. at 121-28.
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on more leverage and orders the managers to stop originating both
subprime mortgages and “teaser rate” mortgages, prime mortgages
requiring no down payment, and instead orders them to sell off as
many as possible, even if that means realizing a loss and incurring
other transaction costs.
Does the CEO’s insightful move improve the stock price? The
bank, which is forced to lower its earnings forecast substantially, can
fully explain the development as a return to a lower-risk corporate
strategy that it believes will pay off when the economy cools and the
returns on the subprime mortgages turn negative. But the result of
not giving the market what it wants can be painful. The new corporate
policy is unlikely to be rewarded precisely because the stock market believes the existing high-leverage corporate strategy, duly ratified by a
rising stock price, is the correct one. The hypothetical thus ends with
the bank’s stock price dropping substantially and the managers’ stock
options going underwater. The story, in short, tracks Part III’s analysis
of the problems confronting managers making investment decisions
given speculative stock pricing under heterogeneous expectations.
Now return to the question asked in this Article’s Introduction:
would increased shareholder power have moderated the bank’s risky
business practices? We think the answer is no. While many of the
CEOs of adversely affected financial institutions certainly must have
agreed with the strategy, some might not have. It is not as if contrarian warnings were not on the table for all to see. The Economist began
206
a series of warnings about real estate price bubbles in 2002. Managers at JPMorgan Chase saw warning signs in the subprime market in
207
Insiders at other banks must have
2005 and so decided to stay out.
208
The question is whether increased
posited similar conclusions.
shareholder empowerment would have emboldened these informed insiders into abandoning the strategy so popular on Wall Street or would
have deterred them. The inference from the evidence lies clearly with
the latter result. Citigroup’s then-CEO, Charles Prince, spoke publicly
of his own second thoughts in 2007, late in the game. He chose to stick
206

See To Burst or Not to Burst?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 7, 2002, at 68 (warning then–
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan to look out for a boom in share prices or
house prices combined with a big increase in debt and overinvestment by firms). The
warning became more focused by 2004. See Will It Be Different This Time?, ECONOMIST,
Oct. 9, 2004, at 22 (predicting a crash of the U.K. housing market).
207
TETT, supra note 202, at 122-24.
208
Cf. Kara Scannell & John R. Emshwiller, Countrywide Chiefs Charged with Fraud,
WALL ST. J., June 5, 2009, at C1 (reporting SEC allegations that Countrywide executives
saw warning signs and decided not to disclose that information to investors).
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with the program despite his second thoughts: “When the music stops,
in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. . . . But as long as the
209
music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.”
210
His upwardly bouncing stock price surely set the motivating rhythms.
The financial sector undertook high-risk/high-return strategies to
211
enhance return on equity and raise stock prices.
The executives
who danced to the rhythm were compensated with stock options and
restricted stock in addition to cash bonuses, and so had incentives
212
roughly in alignment with those of their shareholders.
At least in retrospect we know that the market underestimated the
risk being taken and thus failed to provide an objective, critical reference point for monitoring purposes. To the contrary, stock prices
confirmed the strategies until well past the point of no return. We
think that Arthur Levitt got it exactly wrong. Shareholder power was a
part of the problem and is not a part of the solution.

209

Stephen Kotkin, A Bear Saw Around the Corner, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at BU2
(reviewing and quoting from JAMES GRANT, MR. MARKET MISCALCULATES: THE BUBBLE
YEARS AND BEYOND (2008)).
210
A recent empirical study of executive compensation at financial companies
compares those that did badly in the financial crisis (such as AIG, Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Countrywide, and Lehman) against those that did better (such as Berkshire Hathaway, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo). Ing-Haw Cheng et al.,
Yesterday’s Heroes: Compensation and Creative Risk-Taking 5-10, 22-26 (Oct. 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1502762. The study
finds (a) a statistically and economically significant connection between executive
compensation and price-based measures of risk such as beta and stock return volatility;
(b) that higher-paying firms were more likely to be in the tails of performance; and (c)
a positive relation between residual compensation and subprime exposure. Id.; see also
Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis 1, 12
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 256/2009, 2009), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1439859 (reporting on an empirical study and showing
“that there is no evidence that banks with a better alignment of CEOs’ interests with
those of their shareholders had higher stock returns during the crisis and some evidence that banks led by CEOs whose interests were better aligned with those of their
shareholders had worse stock returns and a worse return on equity”).
211
See, e.g., William D. Cohan, Op-Ed., A Tsunami of Excuses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
2009, at A23 (criticizing the testimony of financial executives to Congress who alleged
that the financial crisis was unavoidable).
212
The mix among stock options, restricted stock, and cash bonuses varied from
company to company and from executive to executive within each company. For example, in 2006, Citibank disclosed a heavier weighting to cash bonuses, whereas Bank
of America relied more on stock options. Compare Citigroup Inc., Definitive Proxy
Statement (Schedule 14A), at 39-52 (Mar. 14, 2006), with Bank of Am. Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 22-27 (Mar. 20, 2006).
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B. The Changing Policy Context
Financial collapse reorients policy agendas. Is the shareholder
agenda helped or hurt by these developments? As noted above, a
large clientele believes that market exuberance can be fixed by giving
shareholders more say. We think the policy implications go in the
opposite direction. What is needed is incentive compatibility for
managers. Incentive compatibility and shareholder accountability,
however, do not yield the same results.
We noted in Part III that the heterogeneous expectations models
213
have an important implication for executive compensation plans.
Equity-based incentive-alignment schemes need to filter out speculative market inputs. Long-term holding constraints, whether attached
to restricted stock or stock options, are the means to the end. Professors Sanjai Bhagat and Roberta Romano recommend prohibiting resales of eighty to eighty-five percent of the equity granted until two to
four years after the manager leaves the company, with such restric214
tions extending down the hierarchy to cover bonus plans for traders.
The idea is to drive a wedge between the incentives of shareholders
who are active in the market and those of managers. As we also noted
in Part III, managers taking equity compensation under resale restrictions resemble blockholders more than the dispersed shareholders on
whom reform proponents continue to focus.
The manager/shareholder wedge has a second significant effect.
Market shareholders tend to diversify their holdings in order to mi215
nimize risk.
Resale-constrained managers are underdiversified and
presumptively carry more risk than portfolio investors. As they bear
more risk they tend toward risk-averse investment strategies. Thus
does the emerging consensus favoring strict resale constraints reverse
long-held views respecting equity-based compensation, views shaped

213

See supra text accompanying notes 186-88.
Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing
and Committing to the Long-Term 7, 12-13, 15-16 (Yale Law & Econ., Research Paper No.
374, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1336978. The authors reason that a
two-year minimum suffices to diffuse the incentive to manage earnings; by the end of
four years the intermediate-term effects of the manager’s contribution will have
worked their way into the stock price. Id. at 7.
215
See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 30 (1991) (“[T]he vast majority of investments are held by people with
diversified portfolios.”); Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial
Power Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 858-59 (2002) (factoring free transferability and hedging into the opportunity cost of a stock option).
214
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216

during the 1980s. Stock options, which build in sensitivity to upside
gain and insensitivity to downside loss, long have been deemed the
compensation mode of choice because they counterbalance the risk
aversion that accompanies the undiversified investments of human
capital that executives make in their companies. Up until now, management stock resales have been viewed as a matter for contractual
trade-off—because they make it possible for the executives to diversify
their investment portfolios, they increase the value of the compensation plan to the recipient and so reduce costs of compensation to the
217
corporate employer and its shareholders.
The times have changed. Even bank CEOs now acknowledge a
need for boards to be scrupulous about compensation structures and
218
incentives, toward the goal of “trust restoration.”
Bhagat and Romano, even as their proposal addresses the TARP compensation constraints for financial companies, nonetheless commend its resale re219
strictions for the boards of all publicly traded companies. Bebchuk
and Spamann go farther still, at least with regard to TARP recipients,
contending that any equity-based compensation scheme holds out a
possibility of incentivizing excessive risk taking, due to the combina220
They rection of high leverage and the equity’s limited liability.
ommend basing incentive compensation on enterprise value rather
than shareholder value—that is, rewards should be based on the value
221
of a package of common stock, preferred stock, and bonds.

216

See generally Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and TopManagement Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 261-62 (1990) (finding the relation between executive wealth and shareholder wealth to be small, partly because executive
compensation structures were not highly sensitive to performance at the time).
217
Critics of compensation plans have questioned this analysis in part, recommending resale restraints that balance the long-term time horizon with the executive’s interest
in liquidity and diversification. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 130, at 174-76 (concluding that the efficient balance between restrictions on cashing out vested options and executives’ interest in liquidity and diversification will vary from firm to firm). But cf. William W. Bratton, Supersize Pay, Incentive Compatibility, and the Volatile Shareholder Interest, 1
VA. L. & BUS. REV. 55, 75 (2006) (recommending across-the-board resale constraints).
218
See Green, supra note 5, at 3 (“Public trust depends on a responsible, measured
attitude to compensation.”).
219
Bhagat & Romano, supra note 214, at 3-4.
220
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay 3-4 ( John M.
Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 641, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1410072.
221
Id. at 5-6; see also Viral V. Acharya et al., Corporate Governance in the Modern Financial Sector (recommending a focus on return on assets rather than return on equity), in
RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 185, 193-94 (Viral
V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009).
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These new views on executive compensation bespeak a seismic
shift in thinking about shareholder-manager relations. Compensation
is the margin on which business policymakers align the incentives.
Formerly, the shareholders were seen as a unitary population for
whose interest the stock price provided a robust proxy. Now we see
that at certain critical times the shareholder interest can disaggregate,
with some shareholders’ interests diverging from near-term stock
price maximization. In such times, maximizing the market price provides faulty instructions to managers, undermining the claims of
shareholder proponents and supporting the need for managers to exercise their business judgment independently. Recent changes in notions about appropriate management incentives accordingly come as
no surprise. The new model, which seeks to cast management in the
mold of a long-term holder, may be more hypothetical than descriptive of actual shareholders at many companies.
CONCLUSION
This Article bases its case against shareholder empowerment on
the modern financial economics of market pricing. It cites information asymmetry and new financial economic theories of speculative
overpricing. We underscore the importance of the new economics by
reference to bank stocks during the period 2000 to 2008—a reference
that leads ineluctably to consideration of the implications of the financial crisis for corporate law’s political economy. There, on the
critical topic of executive compensation, we already see the shareholder interest, as manifested in the market price, retreating in the
corporate governance system’s rearview mirror.
Shareholder proponents will object, pointing out that banks are
different. Their businesses are built on assets and liabilities with mismatched durations, necessitating a protective deposit-insurance regime. That in turn holds out moral hazard in the form of speculative
investment, with prudential regulation following to square the circle.
Producers of goods and services in other sectors do not hold out these
special risks. As to them, the shareholder case remains intact, or so
goes the argument.
We see it differently. Our case, albeit brought home at the extreme, is not thereby limited. We have shown that excessive reliance on
market pricing poses problems for corporate governance. We certainly
do not claim that shareholder inputs shaped by market prices are intrinsically unreliable. We do claim that mispricing is a salient possibility, more so in times of economic volatility. It follows that price signals
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need to be interpreted by an agent exercising sound business judgment, with the independent board of directors bearing that burden.
The shareholder case, in contrast, follows from a theory that
merges agency-cost reduction, value maximization, and price signals
into a unitary whole to yield a one-size-fits-all governance instruction.
This Article breaks open this holistic theoretical construct. Once that
is accomplished, the shareholder proponents have no riposte because
they have never thought it necessary to confront the difficulties of balancing the benefits and detriments of market inputs and to restate
their case in a realistic cost-benefit framework.
We have no idea what such a robust shareholder empowerment
case might look like. Pending its articulation, we think any reform following from the shareholder agenda to be inopportune in the present
context. The prevailing governance system has proven itself quite
responsive to market inputs. Shareholder power has waxed over the
past several decades as an endogenous market response to changes in
the economic environment. The high residual agency costs of thirty
years ago have been cured by cost-effective increases in market monitoring and director bonding. Money on the table has that effect.
Now, in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, the question
is whether the self-adjusting market mechanism proved overly responsive to shareholder pressure by staking executive fortunes on shortterm price effects. If the financial crisis teaches us anything, it is that
managing to the market is the problem that needs to be addressed.
That calls for recalibration of compensation mechanisms, not legislative change to increase shareholder power.
More generally, today’s regulatory questions concern the constraint
of business discretion in the wake of market failure, in particular, risk
taking in pursuit of shareholder gain. Despite the shareholder proponents’ recent reframing of their case in terms of trust, shareholder empowerment remains what it always has been—a strategy that looks to
regulatory reform that enhances market control over the zone of discretion in which directors make business judgments.
Regulatory reform strategies henceforth could proceed in the opposite direction. The pure financial incentives that advantage shareholder inputs in expansive, deregulatory times register equivocally in
the face of public demands for control of market risk taking. Debates
on executive pay are beginning to bear out this point. Regulations
that seriously address risk taking will bypass the shareholders to impose constraints on financial corporations directly, narrowing their
zone of freedom of action. As between managers and shareholders,
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such initiatives cause power to flow the managers’ way. With regulation comes the responsibility to comply, a burden that falls on directors and officers. The more extensive the forthcoming regulatory intervention, the more irrelevant the shareholder empowerment
strategy will become. This strategy has, in our view, reached the outer
limits of its effectiveness for the time being.

